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?. Introduction
The obligations contained in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights? (hereinafter, TRIPs Agreement) are somewhat different from those in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter, GATT)? and General Agreement on Trade in Service (hereinafter, 
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? Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instrument-Result of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 
I.L.M. 112 (1994).
? General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 stat. A-II T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. GATT 
?GATS).? Out of the TRIPs Agreement's major commitments, only the national treatment and the most 
favored-nation treatment deal with direct obstacles to trade.? Considering intellectual property and trade, 
the absence of intellectual property protection is not a direct barrier to international trade.? Moreover, 
the terms "competitive" and "protective" between intellectual property community and GATT regime 
have traditionally been in contrast.?
In regard to intellectual property community, the protection of intellectual property rights has been 
considered anti-competitive because it could limit public access.? However, the TRIPs Agreement 
within the WTO system,? intended mainly to promote global competition,? treats the protection of 
intellectual property rights as pro-competitive.?? In other words, in adopting the TRIPs Agreement,??
1994 was incorporated into the 1994 World Trade Organization Agreement. Arts. 3, 4, 10.
?
 The GATT and GATS under WTO regime intend to assure non-discrimination in restraints on trade through 
national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment; to prevent quantitative restrictions on trade; to prevent unfair 
trade practices; and to preserve commitments or bindings undertaken in trade negotiations. See General Agreement 
on Trade in Service, Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, The 
Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations – The Legal Texts 325, 33 I.L.M. 1667 (1994). 
? See Gail E. Evans, Intellectual Property as a Trade Issue: The Making of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, World Competition, L. & Econ. Rev. 137, 140, 160 (Dec. 1994), cited by
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievement of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPs and 
Dispute Settlement Together, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 275, 279 n.6 (1997).
? Id. 
? Id.
? Id.
? For the TRIPs as the most significant movement forward the creation of specific or hard rules in the 
WTO/GATT system, see Frederick M. Abbott, Incomplete Rules Systems, System Incompatibilities and Suboptimal 
Solutions: Changing the Dynamic of Dispute Settlement and Avoidance in Trade Relations Between Japan and the 
United States, 16 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 185, 199 (1999).
? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble.
?? For an argument that minimum intellectual property standards are a free trade issue, see Evans, supra note 4.
??
 For a summary of the Uruguay Round negotiations leading to the TRIPs Agreement, see Carlos A. Primo 
Braga, Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues: The Uruguay Round Agreement and its Economic Implications, in
The Uruguay Round and The Developing Economics, 381, 384 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds. 1995); John 
Croome, Reshaping The World Trading System: A History of The Uruguay Round 130, 251, 283 (1995); Ernest H. 
Preeg, Traders in a Brave New World: The Uruguay Round and The Future of The International Trading System 
(1995). See generally Edmond McGovern, International Trade Regulation, ch. 21 (Globefield Press, 1995); L. Peter 
Farkas, ABA Sec. Int'l L. & Prac.,Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property in The World Trade Organization: 
The Multilateral Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation 463 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 
1996); Frederick M. Abbott, The Future of the Multilateral Trading System in the Context of TRIPs, 20 Hastings Int’l 
& Comp. L. Rev. 661, 661 (1997); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection 
under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 Int’l Law. 345, 345 (1995); J. H. Reichman, The TRIPs 
Component of the GATT’s Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated 
World Market, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 171, 171 (1993); Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property After 
the Uruguay Round, 42 J. Copyright Soc. 18, 18 (1994); Jeffrey A. Divney & Gary J. Connell, Intellectual Property 
Provisions of the GATT, 23 Colo. Law. 1069, 1069 (1994); Hans Ullrich, TRIPs: Adequate Protection, Inadequate 
?WTO members framed the role of IPRs protection within the overall WTO trade-centered strategy for 
economic growth.??
Thus, the ultimate purpose of the international regime of trade-related?? aspects of intellectual 
property rights under the WTO is to promote protection of intellectual property rights and to remove trade 
barriers in order to secure fair opportunities for the member countries.?? The unfair and anti-competitive 
practices by public or private entities in the domestic intellectual property markets, ?? as well as in
commodity?? or service?? markets, can provide a further means of protection in addition to frontier 
barriers.?? Such anti-competitive practices in the domestic markets have been regarded as important in 
Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, 4 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 153, 153 (1995); Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and 
International Intellectual Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 Am. U. J. Int’l & Pol’y 465, 465 
(1994).
??
 Concerning the role of intellectual property rights protection within the overall WTO trade-centered strategy 
for economic growth, see Frederick M. Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPs: A Challenge for the World 
Economic System - Editorial, 1 J. Int'l Econ. L. 497, 497 (1998) (stating "... under-and over-protection of IPRs did not 
undermine the economic strategy and ultimate objectives of the organization. ... protection of IPRs may be an 
important part of the WTO's strategy for achieving world-wide economic growth, and the protection of the IPRs may 
itself be important ... ").
?? For the 'trade' vs 'trade-relate' relating to TRIPs, see Chantal Tomas, Trade-Related Labor and Environment 
Agreement? 5 J. Int'l Econ. L. 791, 792 (2002) (stating "... although intellectual property right can be traded in 
licensing and other rights-transfer agreements, neither intellectual property rights nor intellectual property need be 
traded for TRIPs to apply. Rather, the larger premise of TRIPs is that intellectual property rights are affected by 
trade ...").
?? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble.
?? See James F. Rill & Mark C. Schechter, International Antitrust and Intellectual Property Harmonization of 
the Interface, 34 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 783, 797 (2003) (stating "different countries have distinct antitrust 
approaches ... fundamentally speaking, intellectual property law and antitrust law present no major conflicts with 
each other, as both areas of law center on the innovation process and the expansion of economic activity."). 
?? See Eun Sup Lee, Anti-Competitive Practices as Trade Barriers Used by Korea and Japan, 17 Transnat'l 
Law. 177, 179 (2004) (discussing anti-competitive practices as trade barriers).
?? See Eun Sup Lee, Anti-Competitive Practices as Trade Barriers Used by Korea and Japan: Focusing in 
Service and Investment Markets, 16 Bond L. Rev. 117, 118-19 (2004) (discussing anti-competitive practices as trade 
barriers in service/investment markets).
?? As for the most visible and well documented instance of a cross border dispute regarding alleged restrictive 
business practices affecting trade, see the film dispute between the U.S. and Japan [Section 304 Determinations: 
Barriers to Access to the Japanese Market for Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, 61 Fed. Reg.30, 929(June 18, 
1996)] cited by William H. Barringer, Competition Policy and Cases Border Dispute Resolution: Lessons Learned 
from the U.S.-Japan Film Dispute, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 459, 460 (1998).
?the intellectual property markets as in commodity?? or service?? markets due to their competition and 
trade-distorting effects??. 
Simultaneously, as for major frontier barriers to international trade among the member countries 
have been reduced through the multilateral negotiations under the GATT/WTO system, worldwide 
interest in the anti-competitive practices in domestic intellectual property markets?? as well as in 
goods?? and service?? markets under the WTO mechanism has been increasing.?? With relation to 
these practices, Korea and Japan have traditionally been targets of criticism from their trade partner 
countries?? due to the lack of proper and sufficient protection of intellectual property rights in domestic 
markets?? compared to their respective trade volumes and market sizes.??
This paper is a comparative study of the anti-competitive practices in the Korean and Japanese
intellectual property markets to examine the regulation of anti-competitive practices and suggest some 
direction for the improvement of the regulatory policy/measures in those markets and for more efficient 
operation of the TRIPs Agreement. It focuses on cultural/social aspects of the two countries' anti-
competitive practices which could not properly be evaluated under the current WTO framework, and 
suggests some proposals to improve the current WTO provision and dispute settlement mechanism.
?? See Lee, supra note 16, at 178-80.
?? See Lee, supra note 17, at 119-20.
?? See id. at 117.
??
 For the difficulty to ascertain the extent to which anti-competitive business practices have replaced formal 
barriers to trade as impediments to market access, see Barringer, supra note 18, at 477, cited by Lee, supra note 16, 
179 n.6.
?? See Lee, supra note 16, at 177.
?? See Lee, supra note 17, at 117.
?? As for the notable comment on the continuously emerging character of the new trade barriers, particularly, 
the private restraints and uncaught government restraints, see Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market 
Access, 91 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 3-4 (1997), cited by Jason E. Kearns, International Competition Policy and the GATS: A 
Proposal to Address Market Access Limitation in the Distribution Service Sector, 22 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 285, 285 
(2001).
??
 For example, Japanese and Korean policies and practices related to market access have usually been 
discussed in the annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. This report is prepared by the 
United States Trade Representative to identify policies and practices of U.S. trading partners that the USTR considers 
inconsistent with a legal obligation or otherwise unfair to U.S. industry. Abbott, supra note 8, at 190.
?? For the little protection against weak national competition laws under the WTO, see Kearns, supra note 25, 
at 293-94 (stating that an across-the board failure to enact strong competition laws is not obvious breach of any 
obligation).
?? See Lee, supra note 17, at 118.
?It analyzes the effects of competition on their trade policies,?? considering the growing interest in 
anti-competitive practices, particularly in intellectual property markets, and the criticism focused around
these two countries. In this study, the term "anti-competitive practices" includes the private restrictive 
business practices or infringement of intellectual property rights as well as the governmental regulations 
of such practices or infringements, which hamper the flow of trade and fair competition, and have been 
regarded as trade barriers. 
?. International Regulation
A. Anti-competitive Practices as Trade Barriers
One approach to regulate unfair and anti-competitive practices as trade barriers?? is to ameliorate
the conflicts between the trade policy and the competition policy.?? Herewith, trade barrier means any 
kind of entry barrier to an importing countries' domestic market which impedes the complete national 
?? As for the recent trends of international trade institutes to concentrate on the effects of domestic competition 
policy on trade policy, Michael K. Young, Lessons from the Battle Fronts: U.S.-Japan Trade Wars and Their Impact 
on the Multilateral Trading System, 33 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 753, 753, 755-56 (2001), cited by Lee, supra note 16, 
at 179.
?? For papers on international aspects to regulate anti-competitive practices, see Lee, supra note 16; D. Daniel 
Sokol, Express Delivery And The Postal Sector In The Context Of Public Sector Anti-Competitive Practices, 23 Nw. 
J. Int'l L. & Bus. 353, 353-81 (2003) (focusing on the problem of a particular type of service and the trade barriers on 
this service(express delivery)); Hiroyuki Fuji, The Kodak-Fuji Dispute: A Spectrum Of Divergent Colors And A 
Blueprint For A New WTO Procedure For Disputes Involving Government Toleration Of Anti-Competitive Practices, 
2 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 317, 317-42 (1997-1998) (proposing a revision of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade in order to establish the WTO as the new and credible champion of international dispute 
settlements); William H. Barringer & James P. Durling, Out Of Focus: The Use Of Section 301 To Address 
Anticompetitive Practices In Foreign Markets, 1 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 99, 99-142 (1996) (discussing 
particular problems in using Section 301 to target allegedly anti-competitive private company acts and offering some 
thoughts for a more constructive approach to the future disputes); Peter Glossop, Anti-Competitive Practices In The 
South African Film Industry: Applying Apartheid-Era Competition Law In A Post-Apartheid Environment, 17 Eur.
Competition L. Rev. 40, 40-50 (1996)  (regarding the problem of controlling anti-competitive practices in the new 
South Africa); Frank J. Schweitzer, Flash Of The Titans: A Picture Of Section 301 In The Dispute Between Kodak 
And Fuji And A View Toward Dismantling Anticompetitive Practices In The Japanese Distribution System, 11 Am. U. 
J. Int'l L. & Pol'y  847, 847-75 (1996) (focusing on the discretionary use of Section 301 in response to Kodak's 
claim of denied access to the Japanese film market because of "unreasonable" acts of the Japanese Government in its 
"toleration" of anticompetitive trade practices by Fuji); James Kirkbride, Anti-Competitive Practices Under the 
Competition Act 1980- The Real Meaning And Approach, May 1991 J. Bus. L. 245-60 ( reviewing the application, 
under the Competition Act 1980, of this all -embracing effects-based definition).
?? See Terence P. Stewart, U.S.-JAPAN Economic Disputes: The Role of Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Laws, 16 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 689, 736 (1999) (criticizing that the members of the GATT/WTO have 
accomplished much in the way of trade liberalization, however, they have not changed the relationship between trade 
laws and competition laws in a global economy).
?treatment.??  Anti-competitive practices in domestic intellectual property markets could also be 
considered as one type of trade barrier?? as in the case of goods?? and service?? markets, due to such 
practices in domestic markets that could hamper the trade flow and impede the national treatment. 
While the multilateral or plurilateral efforts?? chronically have been made in vain?? to create a 
consensus??  on the regulation of anti-competitive business practices,??  the issue of the anti-
competitive practices?? has been raised in recent years in WTO contexts,?? particularly, since the 
?? See Lee, supra note 16, at 178.
?? For the difficulty to question the matters of domestic regulation on the anti-competitive practices through 
WTO dispute resolution mechanism, see James, D. Southwick, Addressing Market Access Barriers in Japan through 
the WTO: A Survey of Typical Japan Market Access Issues and the Possibility to Address Them through WTO 
Dispute Resolution Procedures, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 923, 925 (2000) (stating "... should not be questioned 
through WTO ... absent strong proof of discrimination, nullification or impairment of trade benefits, or a violation of 
another WTO rule); See Abbott, supra note 8, at 185; See Kearns, supra note 25, at 297 (stating " ... more troubling, ... 
is that the WTO panel ... lacks the competence and resources to address the problem of discriminatory enforcement of 
domestic competition laws ...").
?? See Lee, supra note 16, at 179.
?? See Lee, supra note 17, at 119-20.
?? For the details of those efforts, see John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal 
Problems of International Economic Relations 1090- 1102 (3d ed. 1995).
?? See Abbott, supra note 8, at 185 (stating that even though the WTO mechanism strengths the GATT system 
to the law-based framework, there are important gaps in the WTO rule system, one of which is the absence of 
minimum rules on the maintenance of competitive domestic markets).
?? For the general consensus about the importance of the interface between trade and competition policies, see
Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at World Trade Organization, 33 Geo. Wash. 
Int'l L. Rev. 585, 587 (2001), cited by Lee, supra note 16, at 183-84 (stating major factors to trigger the consensus).
??
 For the major facts about domestic competition laws to be added to the complexity of the international 
agreements on competition policy, see Kearns, supra note 25, at 288-90, cited by Lee, supra note 17, at 120.
??
 For the discussed hierarchical status of the WTO Agreement on competition designed to deal with market 
access problems caused by anti-competitive practices, see Hindly, Competition Law and the WTO: Alternative 
Structures for Agreement on Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisite for Free Trade, cited by Jean-Françios Bellis, 
Anti-competitive Practices and the WTO: The Elusive Search for New World Trade Rules, in New Directions in 
International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson, 365-66 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 
2000), cited by Lee, supra note 16, at 181 n.18 (stating "... it has been suggested that a WTO Agreement on 
Competition could be limited to a Ministerial Declaration to facilitate the application of Article XIII ...").
??
 TRIPs Agreement speaks directly to the issue of restrictive business practices: "i) Article 9 directs the 
Council ... to consider ... provisions on ... competition policy; ii) Articles 8, 31 and 40 address ... anticompetitive 
practices in licensing agreements, the abuse of intellectual property right, and restrictions on compulsory licensing." 
Kennedy, supra note 38, at 602-03. The TRIPs Agreement, however, has been evaluated to do little to resolve issues 
of the intellectual property/antitrust interface. See Rill & Schechter, supra note 15, at 789-90. Besides, WTO dispute 
resolution mechanism has been established to provide a WTO-sanctioned basis for challenging national laws that are 
designed ostensibly to prevent anticompetitive abuses of intellectual property but that actually unjustifiably impede 
the legitimate exercise of intellectual property rights. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 63-64, cited by id. at 
790. Nevertheless, there does not appear to have been any dispute resolution proceeding to date involving the 
intersection of intellectual property and competition. Id. at 790-91.
?Doha Ministerial Declaration following the Singapore Ministerial Conference?? contained a provision 
for negotiations concerning trade-related competition subjects.??
Besides the international attempts to deal with this matter, many developed countries have 
regulated various kinds of anti-competitive practices through the expansion and application of the concept 
of "fair trade" provided in international or individual domestic trade laws,??as in the commodity?? and 
service/investment?? markets. For example, anti-competitive or unfair practices in intellectual property 
markets under Special 301 of the Trade Act of 1974?? would include the government's acts, practices or 
policies to deny "adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights", or to deny "fair and 
equitable market access to United States persons who rely upon intellectual property protections".?? The 
concept of reasonable or fair practices, which exceeds the scope of the tariff or non-tariff barriers at the 
borders, has become the widely and strictly accepted basis of securing fair competition in the foreign 
market.??
?? A Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 agreed to study issues relating to the interaction between 
trade and competition policy. WTO/Singapore Ministerial 1996-Ministrial Declaration, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min96-e/wtodoc.e.htem  (lasted visited Jan. 13, 2006). 
?? The Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition has focused into effects on 
"hardcore" cartels transparency, nondiscrimination, procedural fairness and modalities for voluntary cooperation. 
WTO Ministerial Conference, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01) /DEC/1, 23-25 (2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO-e/minist-e/minisr-e/min01-e/mindecl-e.%20pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2006), 
cited by Rill & Schechter, supra note 15, at 791.
?? Besides, the developed countries have tried to regulate those practices with the extraterritorial application of 
their domestic laws or positive comity. For the cases relating to extraterritorial enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust 
Laws, see Jackson, et al., supra note 36, at 1078-89, cited by Lee, supra note 17, at 122 n.23; Merit E. Janow, Public, 
Private, and Hybrid Public/Private Restraints of Trade: What Role for the WTO?, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 977,
978-79 (2000), cited by Lee, id. For the positive comity as an important development to substitute the extraterritorial 
application of the domestic anti-trust law, see Janow, id. at 979, cited by Lee, id. n.24.
?? See Lee, supra note 16, at 179-80.
?? See Lee, supra note 17, at 119-20.
??
 Special 301(19 U.S.C.A. §2411(d)) requires the USTR to name as "priority foreign countries" those 
countries: "... ) ... not ... provide adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights." cited by Ralph H. 
Folsom, Michael W. Gordon & John A. Spanogle, Jr., International Business Transactions, 857 (2002). Under a 
special 301 violation, the USTR is directed to identify those foreign countries, see Robert J. Pechman, Seeking 
Multilateral Protection for Intellectual Property: The United States "TRIPs" Over Special 301, 7 Minn. J. Global 
Trade 179, 195 (1998), and once a country is identified under a special 301 violation, a super 301 measure is initiated. 
See id. at 184. Hence, whether employing a regular, special, or super 301 measure, the USTR has the weapons needed 
to properly fight intellectual property theft. Richard J. Ansson, Jr., International Intellectual Property Rights, The 
United States, and the People’s Republic of China, 13 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L. J. 1, 10 (1999).
?? See Folsom, et al., supra note 47; For the details of these and other petitions, see the USTR website, at
http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (stating "by way of example, ... the Section 301 action ... against 
Brazil in 1987 was in response to a petition brought by the Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association (PMA). The 
PMA also filed a petition in 1988 against Argentina on the issue of patent protection ..."). 
??
 For the possible options for solving cases involving such anti-competitive practices, for example, in the 
United States, see Peter E. Ehrenhaft & Asil Holdo, Corporate Counsel Committee Briefing on International 
?B. TRIPs Agreement
1. General Regulations
While there have been many elaborate systems of international institutions?? and rules?? to 
internationally regulate the intellectual property and associated rights thus far,?? the TRIPs component 
of the WTO Agreement?? represented a revolution in international property law.?? TRIPs Agreement 
Antitrust and U.S.-Japan Relations, The American Society of International Law Newsletter, Sept. 1995, (file-Lexis), 
cited by Lee, supra note 16, at 184 n.46 (stating "... ) ... Section 301; ) ... anti-trust action in the ... court ... ; ) ... 
procedures under WTO; or ) urge 'positive comity' ...").
??
 There are International institutions involved in IPRs-related work: Intellectual Property 
Organization(WIPO), World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO),  International Telecommunications 
Union(ITU), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD), United Nations Development 
Program(UNDP), United Nations Environment Program(UNEP), and World Health Organization(WHO); limited 
membership or regional organizations are organization for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), 
European Patent Office(EPO), African Regional Industrial Property Organization(ARIPO), Andean Pact, APEC, 
European Union, Mercosur and NAFTA. See Abbott, supra note 12, at 498-99.
??
 Even though each of these rules has covered different types of intellectual property rights and have varied in 
terms of their objectives, the "ultimate goal has been movement towards internationally recognized and enforceable 
intellectual property rights". Pechman, supra note 47, at 180-81, cited by Evelyn Su, The Winners and the Losers: 
The Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and It's Effects on Developing Countries, 23 
Hous. J. Int'l L. 169, 178 (2000).
?? For a discussion on the benefits and criticisms of the international lawmaking for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, see Peter K. Yu, World Trade Intellectual Property and the Global Elites: International 
Lawmaking in the New Millennium: An Introduction, 10 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, Symposium, 1-4 (2002).
??
 There have been the serious debates on the issues in relation with this component: ) whether the GATT 
has competence in the full range of issues addressed by TRIPs. Eileen Hill, U.S. Addresses Contentious Issues in 
Negotiation on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Business America, Nov. 19, 1990, at 18, cited 
by Su, supra note 51, at 202 n.189; ii) whether the WTO should have jurisdiction over intellectual property instead of 
WIPO. Pechman, supra note 47, at 183-84, cited by Su, supra note 51, at 202 n.189; iii) the TRIPs Agreement 
exceeds the purpose of GATT. Doane, supra note 11, at 465, 472-73, cited by Su, supra note 51, at 202 n.189; iv) 
developed countries prevent new technology from being transferred to the developing countries by the intellectual 
property protections. Carlos A. Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT: A View 
From the South, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 243, 252 (1989), cited by Su, supra note 51, at 202 n.189.
?? See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing 
Countries?, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 441, 442 (2000) (stating "... it built on the Paris and Berne convention ... 
TRIPs went well beyond the original anti-copying objective of the drafters ...").
?introduced a brand new era?? that extends the global reach of IP regulation?? based on the concepts of 
protection and exclusion rather than dissemination and competition.??
Unlike the earlier conventions, TRIPs does not merely circumscribe the range of acceptable 
policies governments may practice,?? but obliges a government to take positive action to protect 
intellectual property rights.?? The international standards of intellectual property protection set out in 
the TRIPs Agreement to determine the level of competition for knowledge goods that are sold or licensed 
on the global market that emerged from the WTO Agreement.??
For the purpose of the TRIPs Agreement, the term "intellectual property"?? being defined as a set 
of the intangible products of human activity?? refers to all categories?? of intellectual property??
??
 The earlier GATT 1947 [art. XX(d), now art. XX (d) of GATT1994] specially referred to intellectual 
property rights, permitting measures which would otherwise be inconsistent with the General Agreement to be taken 
to secure compliance with laws or regulation resulting, inter alica, to intellectual property rights. 
??
 For the two main reasons to promote governments to enter the international agreements on the TRIPs, see
Su, supra note 51, at 173.
?? For the three major problematic areas in respect to the balanced approach to intellectual property protection 
for facilitating innovation, assuring wide dissemination of advances, and allowing countries to continue their 
individual development, see Howard C. Anawalt, International Intellectual Property, Progress, and the Rule of Law, 
19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 383, at 392-400 (2003). See also United Nations Develpoment 
Programme, Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work For Human Development, 102 
(Oxford University Press 2001) at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2001/en/pdf/completenew.pdf (last visited Jan. 
19, 2006).
?? See Anwalt, supra note 57, at 387.
?? Bernard Hoekman & Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From GATT 
to WTO 156 (Oxford University Press 1995), cited by Susan K. Sell, Industry Strategies for Intellectual Property and 
Trade: The Quest for TRIPs, and Post-TRIPs Strategies, 10 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 79, 79 (2002).
??
 Reichman, supra note 54, at 442. 
?? This intellectual property, in general, divides into two main branches: one branch protects the variety of 
inventive works through doctrines such as patents and copyrights; the other protects the identification of goods and 
the "goodwill" value associated with that identification or branding. See Howard C. Anawalt & Elizabeth Enayati 
Powers, IP Startegy-Complete Intellectual Property Planning, Access, and Protection 1-3 (West Group 2001).
?? See Gabriel Garcia, Economic Development and the Course of Intellectual Property Protection in Mexico, 
27 Tex. Int'l L. J. 701, 707 (1992), cited by Su, supra note 51, at 172; Folsom et al., supra note 47, at 758-66, cited by
Su, supra note 51, at 173; Abbott, supra note 12, at 500. It is defined also: "In the sense in which intellectual property 
is relevant to the process of economic development, it refers to legal claims to knowledge, information and creative 
expression." Abbott, supra note 12. 
?? Besides these 7 categories indicated herewith, a subject-matter category mentioned in Part II of the TRIPs 
Agreement(but not included within the definition of "intellectual property") is entitled "Control of Anti-Competitive 
Practices in Contractual Licenses." See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 40, cited by J.H. Reichman, Compliance 
with the TRIPs Agreement: Introduction to a Scholorly Debate, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 363, 366 n.12 (1996)
??
 For the serious criticism about the TRIPs Agreement in regard to the term "intellectual property" referred in 
TRIPs Agreement, see Scott Holwick, Developing Nations and the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, 1999 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 49, 49 ("while the TRIPs Agreement was initially 
conceived to protect product counterfeiting and industrial theft, the language of the Agreement ... threatens each 
??
including copyrights and related rights, trademarks,?? geographical indications,?? industrial designs, 
patents,?? layout-designs of integrated circuits?? and protection of undisclosed information.??
member nation's sovereignty and also undermines the cultural fabric of their respective societies. This is due... to the 
entirely western definition of intellectual property ... which recognizes only private and not communal rights, and 
recognizes knowledge and innovation only on the basis of generating profit and not of meeting social needs. ... The 
split over this issue has often been characterized as arrogant, cash-rich, resource-poor northern nations attempting to 
solidify their economic position at the expense of native cash-poor, resource- rich southern nations.").
?? For the definition of trademark for the purpose of the TRIPs Agreement, see TRIPs Agreement supra note 1, 
art. 15(1). For papers on Trade marks, see Philippe Zylberg, Geographical Indications V. Trademarks: The Lisbon 
Agreement: A Violation of TRIPs?, 11 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L. J. 1, 1-69 (2002-2003) (dealing with the issue of 
conflicting trademarks and geographical indication to recommend adopting Article 14 of E.U. Regulation 2081/92 as 
an alternative to Article 24(5)'s mechanism of resolving conflicting trademarks and geographical indications); Amir 
H. Khoury, Well-Known And Famous Trademarks In Israel: TRIPs From Manhattan To The Dawn Of A New 
Millennium!, 12 Fordham Intell, Prop, Media & Ent. L.J. 991, 991-1039 (2002) (examining the rise of well-known 
and famous marks in the Israeli legal system); Joanna Schmidt-Szalewski, The International Protection Of 
Trademarks After The TRIPs Agreement, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 189, 189-212 (1998) (examining the new rules 
of trademark protection under TRIPS and compares them with existing Paris Convention rules); Paul J. Heald, 
Trademarks And Geographical Indication: Exploring The Contours Of The Trips Agreement, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 
635, 635-60 (1996) (examining TRIPS' substantive trademark provisions); Eleanor K. Meltzer, TRIPs And 
Trademarks, or GATT Got Your Tongue?, 83 Trademark Rep. 18, 18-37 (1993) (focusing on the TRIPs requirements 
proposed in the area of trademarks, marks of geographical origin, and industrial designs).
?? For the definition of geographical indications for the purpose of the TRIPs Agreement, see TRIPs 
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 22(1). For the geographical indications as the agricultural nature, see Paris Convention, 
infra note 100, art. 1(3), cited by Jacqueline Nanci Land, Global Intellectual Property Protection as Viewed Through 
the European Community's Treatment of Geographical Indications: What Lessons Can TRIPs Learn? 11 Cardozo J. 
Int'l & Comp. L. 1007, 1010 n.19 (2004).
?? For the definition of patents for the purpose of the TRIPs Agreement, see TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, 
art. 27(1). For papers on patents, see N.S. Gopalakrishnan, Trips And Protection Of Traditional Knowledge Of 
Genetic Resources: New Challenges To The Patents System, 27 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 11, 11- 18 (Jan. 2005) 
(examining the Agreement on TRIPs Art. 27(3)(b) and the arguments of developing countries for express provisions 
on the disclosure of information on traditional knowledge in the patent specification); Bryan C. Mercurio, Trips, 
Patents, And Access To Life-Saving Drugs In The Developing World, 8 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 211, 211-53 
(2004) (analyzing the agreement implementing Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration); Rishi Gupta, Trips 
Compliance: Dealing With The Consequences Of Drug Patents In India, 26 Hous. J. Int'l L. 599, 599-648 (2004) 
(examining the policy choices of India in granting pharmaceutical product patents); Ellen't Hoen, Trips, 
Pharmaceutical Patents, And Access To Essential Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle To Doha, 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 27,
27-46 (2002) (reviewing Doha Declaration in relation with the sovereign right of governments to take measures to 
protect public health); J. Benjamin Bai, Protecting Plant Varieties Under Trips And Nafta: Should Utility Patents Be 
Available For Plants?, 32 Tex. Int'l L.J. 139, 139-54 (1997) (comparing sui generis system in Europe with the plant 
protection available in the United States and proposing a more desirable compromise than TRIPs and sui generis). 
?? For the scope of protection in layout-design, see TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 36. For the definitions 
of integrated circuits and lay-out design (topography), see Article 2 of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect 
of Integrated Circuits of 1989. [providing "integrated circuits means a product, in its final form or an intermediate 
form, in which the elements, at least one of which is an active element, ... Layout-design (topography) means the 
three-dimensional disposition, however expressed, of the elements, at least one of which is an active element, ..."], 
cited by Elina Mangassarian, Technological Trends and the Changing Face of International Intellectual Property 
Law, 11-SPG Int’l Legal Persp. 125, 132 n.17 (2001). For general aspects of layout-design, see Carlos M, Correa, 
Legal Protection Of The Layout Designs Of Integrated Circuits: The WIPO Treaty, 12 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 196, 
196-203 (July 1990) (regarding a Treaty on Intellectual Property in respect of integrated circuits).
?? For the characteristics of undisclosed information as the intellectual property rights, see Carlos Maria 
Correa, Public Health and International Laws: Unfair Competition under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data 
Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 Chi. J. Int'l L. 69, 82 (2002) (stating "under the discipline of 
unfair competition, ... , protection is not based on the existence of property rights. Hence, the provision of protection 
under such a discipline does not give rise to claims of property rights, with respect to trade secrets and data ... There 
??
Before the Uruguay Round,?? there was not any specific agreement relating to intellectual 
property rights?? under the GATT framework.?? However, the principles contained in the GATT 
relating to measures affecting importation or exportation of goods and to the treatment of imported goods 
could apply, inter alia, to measures taken in connection with intellectual property rights,?? to the extent 
that they fell within their scope.?? A salient feature of TRIPs?? is that comprehensive intellectual 
property right obligations are linked to membership in the worldwide trade system.?? TRIPs is a part of 
more general movement to standardize both the substance and procedure of intellectual property rights on 
a worldwide basis.??
is only possession of this information, which is not treated as property under the TRIPs Agreement. The TRIPs 
Agreement itself, ... , refers to undisclosed information under control of a person, in clear contrast to the concept used 
in the sections relating to other categories ... , such as trademarks or patents.").
?? For the development of the TRIPs proposal under the GATT mechanism, see Doane, supra note 11, at 470-
77.
??
 For the disputes in relation with the inclusion of the intellectual property right to the GATT between the 
developed countries and the developing countries, see Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the third 
World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 689, 695-
96, 718 (1989). 
??
 The GATT earlier addressed the issue of protection for intellectual property rights in 1979, when the 
member nations, however, rejected the Anti-Counterfeit Code which would have addressed trademark counterfeiting. 
Frank Romano, Global Trademark and Copyright 1998: Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in the International 
Marketplace, in International Conventions and Treaties, 562 (Practing Law Institute 1998), cited by Su, supra note 51, 
at 185.
?? For the uneasy contrast between the vocabulary of intellectual property and the vocabulary of the 
GATT/WTO concerning, for example, "competitive" and "protective", see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 
280-81 (stating "... They(intellectual property rights) are ... considered anti-competitive. The TRIPs ... treats(them) ...
as pro-competitive ... . The GATT disfavors protectionism - a word the intellectual property community has long used 
to describe … the copyright ... and trade secrets ... Intellectual property regimes were initially to be integrated by the 
WIPO. The Uruguay Round succeeded where WIPO failed ... . One of the reasons ... was that the architects of the 
TRIPs Agreement used words - and a concept of minimum standards - that allowed each state to read into the 
Agreement that it wished to see ... . Success will depend on how will the GATT/WTO system addresses the 
difference between intellectual property and often trade matters.").
??
 For the difficulty to apply the GATT principles to trade-related intellectual property rights, see Michael A. 
Ugolini, Gray-Market Goods under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 12 
Transnat'l Law. 451, 454 (1999) (stating "in the evolution of international intellectual property, the first hurdle to 
protection was a failure to observe the rule of national treatment that has been carried over into the TRIPs 
Agreement... .  Another hurdle to protection was to fail to observe the most-favored-nation rule that was 
incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement.").
?? For one of the debates between the developed countries and developing countries, which are partial 
backgrounds of the TRIPs to be termed "salient", see Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPs in Seattle: The Not-So- Surprising 
Failure and the Future of the TRIPs Agenda, 18 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 165, 170 (2000).
?? Anawalt, supra note 57, at 387.
??
 For the limits of a trade-based approach to intellectual property under the WTO, see Emery Simon, The 
Integration of Intellectual Property and Trade Policy, Address at ALAI Conference, Geneva (June 27-28, 1994), cited 
by Sandrine Cahn & Daniel Schimmel, The Cultural Exception: Does It Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How 
Does It Affect or Is It Affected by the Agreement on TRIPs? 15 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 281, 306-07 (1997) (stating 
??
The TRIPs Agreement,?? the most ambitious international intellectual property convention ever 
attempted,?? does not specify how members are to implement the provisions in their individual 
countries??, but sets out a comprehensive set of relatively high international minimum standards of 
protection?? to be provided in relation to the rights and even indirectly unfair competition by each 
member.??
"... Focusing on the most visible issue not resolved by the TRIPs, the failure of the WTO agreement to guarantee true 
national treatment to copyright holders is quickly becoming an excuse for discrimination and exploitation.").
??For the comment on the TRIPs Agreement which was the most important and the most controversial
agreement in the 20th century, see Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Proceedings of the 2002 Conference Access to 
Medicines in the Developing World: International Facilitation or Hindrance? : Panel #1: The World Trade 
Organization's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in Context: Economics, 
Politics, Law and Health: Intellectual Property, Corporate Strategy, Globalization: TRIPs in Context, 20 Wis. Int'l L. 
J. 451, 451 (2002) (commenting " ) It was the product of duress by powerful states against weak states. ) It is part 
of a hand bargain in which developing states received very few reciprocal gains. iii) There is the criticism on the 
adverse consequences for developing countries of implementing the agreement.").
?? See Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este Sept. 20. 1986, GATT Doc. Min. Dec. No. 86-1572, cited by
Reichman, supra note 63, at 366.
?? The TRIPs Agreement states that members are free to determine the appropriate method of implementing its 
provisions [TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art.1, 3(1)], though the context of the treaty and the economic force of 
the trade system combine to force member nations to be thorough in implementing these obligations (Anwalt, supra 
note 57, at 388). Partly due to this reason, deference to local law in the WTO dispute settlement procedures regarding 
TRIPs disputes has become a cardinal principle of the interpretative jurisprudence. See Reichman, supra note 54, at 
446-47 (Stating "First, Article 1(1) of the TRIPs Agreement allows states... Second, dispute settlement process cannot 
add or diminish the rights and obligations... Finally, members are not obliged to implement more extensive protection 
than that to which they have expressly agreed ...").
?? For the general view that TRIPs provides minimum standards of protection, see Reichman, supra note 54, at 
443; Unilever NV v. Instituto Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial, IX J.M.P.M.I 179 (1998); Mag Instrument Inc. v. 
Instituto Nacional de la Propiedad Industrial, XIII J.M.P.M.I 121 (1998); see also Pablo Challu & Mirta Levis, 
Adecuacion de la ley Argentina de Patentes al GATT 23 (1996); Carlos M. Correa & Salvador D. Bergel, Patents y 
Competencia 147 (1996); Peter Kolker, GATT-ADPIC y la industria farmaceutica, D. Intel. 13 (1996); Daniel R. 
Zuccherino & Carlos O. Mitelman, Marcas y Patents en el GATT 51 (1997); Felix Rozanski, Nueva legislacion 
Argentina de patentes de invencion, D. Intel. 123 (1996), cited by Silvia Fabiana Faerman, Argentina: The New 
Patent Law and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 8 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 
157, 169 n.55 (2001/2002). For the reason to adopt the international minimum standards in TRIPs, see Ruth L. Gana, 
Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 735, 757 (1996) (stating 
"... the reason ... was the problems which arose if one attempts to import intellectual property laws from a developed 
country to an underdeveloped country. Developing countries ... are unable to immediately align their current 
intellectual property laws with developed countries' intellectual property law ..."). For the distinctive characteristics of 
the TRIPs in relation with the minimum standards, see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 279 (stating "of the 
TRIPs Agreement's three core commitments-national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, and minimum 
standards-only the first two are obligations derived from pre-Uruguay Round versions ... In contrast to the traditional 
GATT provisions, the minimum standards propounded by the TRIPs Agreement are based on the Berne and Paris 
Conventions, ..."). For the controversiality of the minimum standards in WTO system, see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, 
supra note 4, at 281 (stating "... neither the DSU, nor the TRIPs ... provide guidance on how minimum standards ...
rather than actual or optimal standards will work in conjunction with an adjudicatory dispute resolution system ...") . 
?? See TRIPs Agreement supra note 1, at 2(1). (incorporated by reference the Paris Convention, art. 10 bis),
cited by Reichman, supra note 63, at 366-67.
??
TRIPs established broad categories?? of obligatory protection for intellectual property with the 
creation of specific obligations, ?? sometimes in excruciating detail.?? The agreement sets these 
standards by requiring the substantive obligations of the main conventions of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO),??  the Paris Convention??  and the Berne Convention??  to be 
complied with, adding a substantial number of additional obligations?? on matters where the pre-
existing conventions are silent or were seen as being inadequate,?? which makes it a "Berne?? and 
Paris??-plus Agreement."??
?? The breadth of subject matters comprising the "intellectual property" to which minimum standards apply is 
unprecedented, as is the obligation of all WTO member states to guarantee that detailed enforcement procedures as 
specified in the TRIPs Agreement are available under their national laws. Reichman, supra note 63.
?? For the decentralized and centralized approaches of the TRIPs to be adopted, see Jonathan T. Fried, Two 
Paradigms for the Rules of International Trade Law, 20 Can.-U.S.L.J.39, 39  (1994) (contrasting decentralized 
model which rely on the judicial systems of member states, with centralized model which relies increasingly on a new, 
supra-national enforcement structure); Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPs: The Emerging World 
View, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 391, 409-11 (1996) (stressing Council for TRIPs’ role in monitoring implementation 
and compliance as a defining characteristics of the trade-based approach); Reichman, supra note 11, at 384-85, 
(stressing role of periodic reviews by Council for TRIPs as substituting for unilateral policy review by trade 
ministries of developed countries).
?? This switch from general to specific is seen by comparing the overarching requirement under TRIPs that 
member nations provide basic protections of copyrights, patents and other forms of intellectual property with the 
specific protection prescribed for computer software. Anawalt, supra note 57, at 388.
?? For the WIPO's role in producing TRIPs, see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 4, 294 n.48 (1997);
Frederick M. Abbott, The New Global Technology Regime: The WTO TRIPs Agreement and Global Economic 
Development, 72 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 385, 385-86 (1996).
?? The TRIPs adopts a patent law minimum well above the previous standards of the Paris Convention, 
extending both subject matter covered and term of protection. See Sell, supra note 59, at 80.
?? The TRIPs adds additional copyright protection, incorporating the Berne Convention for copyright norms. 
Id.
??
 The agreement adds more specific standards protecting computer programs, databases, sound recordings, 
and pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical companies. Otten & Wager, supra note 84, at 391, 397.
?? Seeking to provide great intellectual property protection, reduce barriers to trade and provide more effective 
enforcement and dispute settlement procedures (see TRIPs Agreement supra note 1, Preamble), TRIPs was a direct 
response to this need to fill the gaps previous treaties left. See id. (a), cited by Land, supra note 66, at 1010.
?? Sept. 9. 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 revised by multilateral copyright 25 U.S.T. 1341, July 14, 1971, Berne 
Convention, available at http://wipo.org (last visited December 27, 2005). For papers on Berne Convention, see
Graeme W. Austin, The Berne Convention as a Canon of Construction: Moral Rights after Dastar, 61 N.Y.U. Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. 111, 111-50 (2005) (reviewing the Daster decision in relation with Berne Convention); Edward J. Ellis, 
National Treatment Under the Berne Convention and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 36 J. L. & Tech. 327, 
327-29 (1996), (addressing the recent conflict over the role of the doctrine of forum non conveniens); William 
Belanger, U.S. Compliance With The Berne Convention, 3 Geo. Mason Indep. L. Rev. 373, 373-402 (1995) 
(reviewing the U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention); Ancel W. Lewis, Jr. Bruce E. Hayden & Sandeep Seth, 
Recent Developments in Copyright Law: The Berne Convention, 22 Colo. L. 2525, 2525-27 (1993) (analyzing the 
effect of the change to copyright law ushered in by the Berne Convention on the attorney's business); Brad Swenson, 
Intellectual Property Protection Through The Berne Convention: A Matter Of Economic Survival For The Post-
Soviet New Commonwealth Of Independent States, 21 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 77, 77-102 (1992) (examining the 
development of the Soviet copyright law and discussing the new Commonwealth of Independent states' necessary 
??
The spirit of the TRIPs Agreement relies on the argument that increased technological capacity??
fosters development.?? To this end, the TRIPs Agreement codified the rights and obligations of 
members in light of a desired balance?? between the protection?? of private intellectual property rights 
adherence to the Berne Convention); Lee D. Neumann, The Berne Convention And Droit De Suite Legislation In The 
United States: Domestic And International Consequences Of Federal Incorporation Of State Law For Treaty 
Implementation, 16 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 157, 157-83 (1992) (analyzing the incorporation of state droit de suite 
legislation into U.S. law giving effect to Berne); Christine L. Chinni, Droit D'auteur Versus The Economics Of 
Copyright: Implications For American Law Of Accession To The Berne Convention, 14 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 145,
145-74 (1992) (contrasting the treatment of authors' moral rights in the United States with the approaches taken in 
France and by the Berne Convention); Corien Prins, Emile Zola Receives An Answer: The Soviet Union Is To Join 
The Berne Convention, 13 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 238, 238-47(July 1991) (discussing some of the most important 
changes in Soviet copyright practice that came about with the advent of perestroika); Scott M. Martin, The Berne 
Convention And The U.S. Compulsory License For Jukeboxes: Why The Song Could Not Remain The Same, 37 J. 
Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 262, 262-329 (1990) (examining the nature of the conflict between present U.S. law and the 
Berne Convention).
??
 Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 revised by 21 U.S.T. 1583 July 14, 1967, Paris convention, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo020en/html (last visited Jan. 7, 2006). The 
Convention concerns only: "patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade 
names, indications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair competition" id. art. 
1(2). The convention applies particularly to the subject of geographical indications due to its recognition 
of agricultural and extractive products as a part of protected industrial property. See Land, supra note 66, 
at 1009-10 (2004). For papers on Paris Convention, see Gustavo Bravo, From Paris Convention To Trips: 
A Brief History, 12 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 445, 445-49 (2001) (assessing the various international 
treaties and multilateral agreements from the treaty's ability to provide trade marks protection); Donald G. 
Daus, Paris Convention Priority, 77 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 138, 138-50 (1995) (regarding the 
development and application of Gosteli); Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, The United States Proporsal for a
GATT Agreement on Intellectual Property and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 265, 265-84 (1989).
?? See Michael J. O'Sullivan, International Copyright: Protection for Copyright Holders in the 
Internet Age, 13 N.Y. Int'l L. Rev. 1, 3 (2000), cited by Su, supra note 51, at 186 (stating that the TRIPs 
Agreement is not considered a new concept in international law, rather it supplements the existing 
international agreements governing the protection of intellectual property rights on a global scale).
??
 For the fundamental logic of the TRIPs to stimulate the innovation, see H. E. Bale, Jr., The 
Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and Product Access and Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals, cited 
by Abbot, supra note 12, n.53 (stating "... the fundamental logic ... to make intellectual property part of 
the WTO ... is ... : to stimulate the innovation..."). For the criticism against the TRIPs, however, in 
relation with not coping with the issue of new technology, see Reichman, supra note 56, at 457-58 
(stating "TRIPs was largely a backwards-looking agreement that relied on time-honored doctrinal norms 
that seemed well-suited to the creative productions of the Industrial Revolution. However, it did not 
seriously address the problems caused by the newer technologies..., There is still no consensus concerning 
such basic patent issues as the subject matter of protection; the novelty and non-obviousness standards of 
eligibility; the scope of the exclusive rights; or the exceptions that all states should be allowed to make. 
Even in copyright law... , no consensus has been reached..."). 
?? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 7, 8, cited by L. Danielle Tully, Prospects for 
Progress: The TRIPs Agreement and Developing Countries After the DOHA Conference, 26 B.C. Int'l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 129, 134 (2003).
?? For the function of patent system in inventing and manufacturing, for example, in the United 
States, see Edwin J. Pringle, The Marvellous Performance of the American Patent System, 10 J. Pat. Off. 
Soc. 255, 258 (1927-1928), cited by Drahos & Braithwaite, supra note 96, at 456. (stating "our Patent 
??
on the one hand and socio-economic and technological development.?? The trade-related goals of the 
agreement?? include the reducing of distortions??? and impediments to international trade,??? and 
ensuring that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not become barriers to 
legitimate trade.???
2. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
TRIPs Agreement requires member countries to create a comprehensive and detailed enforcement 
mechanism.???  Procedural requirements cut even more deeply into national legal systems than 
System has been the primary factor in marking the United States foremost among the nations in 
agriculture, inventing and manufacturing. While, of course, there were other factors, the Patent System 
was by far the most potent one.").
?? For the contradicting function of the intellectual property protection in relation with innovation, see
Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 279 n.10. (stating "In one scenario, innovations could flow more readily 
across state lines in the absence of intellectual property protection, and in the opposite scenario, innovations flow 
through investment and licensing, which is made more likely by the existence of intellectual protection in the 
receiving country."). Besides, for the link in intellectual property law between innovation and free trade, see Anawalt, 
supra note 59, at 396-400.
?? Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra  note 4 at 279 n.6.
?? For the purpose of the TRIPs Agreement to be constructed in consideration of the goal of the WTO, see
Abbott, supra note 12, at 497 (stating "the overarching goal of the WTO is to raise world-wide standards of living ... . 
The TRIPs Agreement was added to the GATT/WTO framework to assure that adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights promoted world trade ... the protection of intellectual property rights may itself be important. 
Nonetheless, the core objectives of the WTO are to improve world-wide standards of living, and not to protect 
intellectual property rights.").
??? For the controversial interpretation of the term "trade distortion", see Dreyfuss & Lawenfeld, supra note 4,
at 281 n.14 (stating "trade distortion was interpreted ... as law of comparative advantage through failure to enforce 
intellectual property rights. However, the term was interpreted ... as foreign government intervention in the market 
place in the name of protecting intellectual property rights.").
??? For the intellectual property protection in relation with the trade barriers, see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, 
supra note 4, at 276 (stating "in the case of minimum standards, the absence of intellectual property protection is not 
a direct barrier to international trade."). For the reduction of impediments to trade in relation with intellectual 
property protection, see Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property
Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 163, 168-69 (1998) (stating that, for example, 
developed countries wanting to export to developing countries with weak intellectual property protection 
infrastructure have to bear the additional transaction cost preventing local imitation of their goods. However, 
developed countries exporting to countries with a strong intellectual property protection infrastructure do not have to 
worry about this extra transaction cost. Thus an international intellectual property protection system will help 
diminish this transaction cost, which would promote the legitimate trade).
??? TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble. For the empirical study on the effects of the TRIPs Agreement 
on international trade by Keith E. Maskus, see Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade-Related are 
Intellectual Property Rights? 39 J. Int'l Econ. 227, 229-30 (1995) (stating that a higher level of intellectual property 
protection can have different effects on the imports, that is, import decrease and also import increase).
??? See Anawalt, supra note 57, at 390. For papers on general enforcement, see Mike Willis, A Survey Of 
Enforcement Measures For International Intellectual Property Rights Under The WTO: Compliance Issues For
??
substantive requirements because they dictate how a nation's courts and administrative bodies shall 
behave.??? Considerable provisions are devoted to the enforcement issues in the agreement??? to 
ensure the effective means of enforcement??? to be available to the right holders,??? and to ensure 
the enforcement procedures be applied to avoid creating of barriers to legitimate trade,??? as well as to 
issues of the abuse??? and the deferent to further infringements.???
The agreement provides for infringing activity in general, providing civil judicial procedures and 
remedies,??? distinctively with counterfeiting??? and piracy??? - the more blatant and egregious 
forms of infringing activity??? - providing for additional procedures and remedies, that is, border 
Developing Countries, 6 Int'l Trade L. Reg. 180, 180-88 (Dec. 2000) (analysing information and material about 
selected Member countries' national laws for informal guide for officials and policymakers in developing countries in 
their efforts to become TRIPs compliant); Donald K. Duvall, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights at The 
Border Under US Law: The Impact of Gatt/Trips, 1 Int'l Trade L. Reg. 201, 201-04 (Dec. 1995) (concerning the 
special border measures in TRIPs which establish border controls to protect each implementing country from 
infringing imports).
??? See Anawalt, supra note 57, at 390.
??? TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, part III.
??? See Richard Schaffer, Beverley Earle & Filiberto Agucti, International Business Law and Its Environment 
519 (2002) (stating that TRIPs was the first WTO agreement to impose positive obligations on WTO signatories to 
adopt the new law; previously, WTO agreements had relied on negative prohibitions, not affirmative obligations).
??? For the right holders' status in TRIPs, see e.g., Jasna Arsic, Combatting Trade in Counterfeit Goods-The 
GATT and the EC Approaches, 18 World Competition Law & Econ. Rev. 86-87 (1995) (stating that "State-to-State 
Nature of the enforcement procedures leaves right owners without effective resource if they are rebutted in foreign 
courts" because their "only choice is to notify [their] government, which might initiate...[WTO] procedures" which do 
"not provide for compensation for the breach of private rights by countries"); Thomas Dreier, TRIPs and the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Right, in From GATT to TRIPs_ The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (Friedrich-Karl Gerhard Schricher eds.) 269-70 (1996) (stating "Even when states treat 
certain provisions of the TRIPs Agreement as self-executing ..."); J.H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement 
Procedures of the TRIPs Agreement, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 335, 346 n.53. (stating "only governments can raise the issue of 
noncompliance outside the domestic legal system.").
??? For some ambiguous provisions in the TRIPs, in relation with a country's ability to restrain trade, Cahn & 
Schimmel, supra note 77, at 306 (criticizing, for example, the article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement).
??? For the intellectual property misuse and risk-abuse in relation with competition law in WTO, see Dreyfuss 
& Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 286 (stating that intellectual property law holds always risk-abuse of the market power 
created by exclusivity, however, the negotiators of the Uruguay Round did not place competition law on their agenda 
except some statements adopted in the biennial meeting of the WTO at ministerial level.); See Abbott, supra note 86, 
at 400.
??? TRIPs Agreement supra note 1, art. 41.
??? Id. part III, ?? 2, 3.
??? Counterfeit goods are in essence defined as goods involving slavish copying of trademarks, and pirated 
goods as goods which violate a reproduction right under copyright or a related right.
???
 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, part III, ? 3.
??
measures and criminal procedures.??? The enforcement provisions of the TRIPs Agreement have been 
established as broad legal standards rather than narrow rules.??? The criticized ambiguousness??? has 
allowed the dispute-settlement panels to take local circumstances and diverse legal philosophies into 
account when seeking to mediate actual or potential conflicts between states.???
On the whole, the TRIPs Agreement increases the range of regulatory standards that states are 
obliged to implement: specifies in greater detail what those standards must be; requires states to 
implement those standards; mandates and institutionalizes greater substantive convergence of national 
??? For the criticism against loose usage of piracy and infringement, for example, during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, see J.H. Reichman, Intellectual property in Intellectual Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT 
Connection, 22 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 747, 769-80 (1989); David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could Be a 
Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge?, 25 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 253, 262-63 (2000) (stating "Intellectual Property fit 
awkwardly into the context of trade negotiations. ... U.S. found itself in the perverse position of arguing that the goal 
of trade liberalizations... To help support this counterintuitive argument, U.S. ...employed the rhetorical device of 
branding foreign copies of U.S. Technology as "pirates". The "piracy" slogan is misleading ...").
??? For the careful consideration required by the concept of minimum standards in regard to such a distinction, 
see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 296 (stating "Where consensus among nations is clean, as it is with 
respect to counterfeiting and piracy, best rules have emerged ... . Where consensus has not emerged, however, 
minimum standards represent an agreement to disagree on the optimal level of protection. Imposing a level of 
protection that was not bargained for ... may, ... , promote trade and enrich current rights holders, but it may also 
work hardship on individual states. ... most worrisome was that high standards of protection could raise the costs of 
innovation and impede the creation of new knowledge.").
???
 Reichman, supra note 107, at 344.
??? See Thomas Dreier, TRIPs and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in From GATT to TRIPs: 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 259-61, 272-73 (Friedrich-Kael Beier & 
Gerhard Schricker eds. 1996), cited by Reichman, id. at 344  (criticizing preference for flexible standards over 
formal rules in general and the watered down language of art. 41(1) which was changed from a requirement to 
"provide effective procedures" to that of providing procedures that "permit effective action" in particular).
??? See Adrian Otten & Hannu Wager, Compliance with TRIPs: The Emerging World View, 29 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l. L. 391, 391 (1996). (stating "These provisions aim to recognize basic differences between national legal 
systems, while being sufficiently precise to provide for effective enforcement action as well as safeguards against 
abuse in the use of enforcement procedures."); Gana, supra note 81, at 735, 770-71, cited by Reichman, supra note 
107, at 344 (stressing alien and conflicting values of some developing countries in regard to enforcement procedures).
??
intellectual property systems; and ties the principle of national treatment??? to a higher set of standards 
for intellectual property protection.???
?. Korean Markets
Korea's intellectual property-protection system has allegedly not been operated well, and, 
particularly, before the establishment of TRIPs Agreement, the terminology of intellectual property rights' 
protection included patent protection has not been familiar to Korean individuals and companies. The 
Korean system to protect intellectual property rights has been a core subject of trade friction between 
Korea and its trade partner countries since 1980s.???
Korea was often listed on the priority watch list of the Super 301 in 1990s, and occasionally spend a 
significant amount of time on the Special 301 priority watch list??? due to inadequate IPR protection 
for the following reasons: They include insufficient IPR enforcement,??? improper provisions of 
Korea's Copyright Act and Computer Program Protection Act(CPPA),??? inappropriate protection of 
???
 For papers on national treatment in relation with intellectual property rights, see Gail E. Evans, The 
Principle of National Treatment and the International Protection of Industrial Property, 18 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev.
149, 149-60 (Mar. 1996) (reviewing the evolution of national treatment principle and the impact of Paris Convention, 
GATT and TRIPs on treatment of intellectual property rights); Margaret Ann Wilkinson, National Treatment, 
National Interest and the Public domain, 1 U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 23, 23-49 (2003-2004) (examining the notion of 
the "public domain" in relation with national treatment and national interest); Amy M. Au, "National Treatment" and 
the International Recognition and Treatment of Trademarks, 12 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 450, 450-53 (2001) 
(commenting the options for the treatment of international intellectual property rights focusing on trademarks); Ellis, 
supra note 91 at 327-28 (addressing the recent conflict over the role of the doctrine as applied to copyright cases); 
Seppo Puustinen, Geographical Indications, Trademarks and the WTO dispute, Int. T.L.R. 2003, 9(6), 167-71 (2003) 
(examining the WTO dispute on trademarks and geographical indications for agricultural products and foodstuffs); 
Teruo Doi, Japan: Intellectual Property- Copyright, 8 Computer & Telecom. L. Rev. N130, N130-31 (2002) 
(examining Japanese copyright law focusing on establishment of moral rights for performers and extension of 
national treatment to performance and phonograms connected with WIPO copyright treaties).
??? See Peter Drahos, Thinking Strategically about Intellectual Property Rights, 21 Telecomm. Pol’y 202 
(1997), cited by Sell, supra note 59, at 80-81.
??? See Eun Sup Lee, Regulation of Foreign Trade in Korea, 26 Ga. J. Int?l & Comp. L. 135, 155?59 (1996) 
(discussing the trade disputes between Korea and the United States). 
???
 Korea was evaluated from the Special 301 Watch List to be on the Priority Watch List in 2004 as the 
result of an Out of Cycle Review conducted in 2003. For the more details, see U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (Korea) (hereinafter, USTR, NTE(Korea))
299-300, at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/2004_NT
E_Report/asset_upload_file776_4779.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 41?61. 
??? See id. arts. 9?14. 
??
clinical drug test data,??? lack of full retroactive protection of pre-existing copyright works??? and 
pharmaceutical patents,??? lack of coordination between Korean authorities in charge of foreigners' 
patent protection, and continued counterfeiting??? of consumer products.???
IPR enforcement has been an issue of serious concern among the trade partner countries despite the 
progressive actions taken by the Korean government in this area over the recent past years:??? They
have, particularly, had serious concerns about the consistency, transparency and effectiveness of Korean 
IPR enforcement efforts regarding software, books, and other products in the Korean market, as well as 
regarding specific provisions of IPR laws???, which may be in breach of the provisions specified in the 
TRIPs Agreement. ???
The Korean government retained a flawed system for notice and takedown of infringing material 
from a service provider's system.??? This system has been criticized by the trade partner countries 
because the system allows all right holders to employ the superior notice and takedown system found in 
??? See id. art. 34(3). 
??? See id. art. 70. 
??? See id. arts. 27?34. 
???
 Counterfeit goods are in essence defined as goods as involving slavish copying of trademarks, and pirated 
goods as goods which violate a reproduction right under copyright or a related right. (see Black's Law Dictionary, (8th
ed. 2004)). Counterfiet goods and services, the most pervasive area of trademark infringement, accounted for 
approximately nine percent of the current market of goods in 2003, a percentage that has been estimated to double by 
the end of 2005. Timothy W. Maier, Counterfeit Goods Pose Real Threat, Insight on the News (Oct. 30, 2003) 
(noting statistics by Carratu International PLC, a firm which investigates intellectual property crimes), available at
http://www.insightmag.com/news/2003/11/11/world/Coun-terfeit.Goods.Pose.Real.Threat-539999.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2006). See also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) (Oct. 
5, 2004) ("Bogus products . . . are estimated to account for up to seven percent of global trade and cost legitimate 
rights holders around the world billions of dollars annually."), at 
http://www.commerce.gov/opa/press/Secretary_Evans/2004_Releases/October/05_STOP_FactSheet.htm (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2006).
???
 For the issue of intellectual property rights protection from the viewpoint of trade dispute between the 
United States and Korea, see Abbott, supra note 86, at 388 ?89 (viewing that one of the motivations of Korea in 
accepting the multilateral TRIPs Agreement was to ameliorate the trade pressure from the United States. Thus, there 
is the appearance of a bargain between the United States and Korea: If Korea abides by their TRIPs Agreement 
commitments, the United States will not unilaterally decide that they are failing to live up to their obligations and 
impose trade sanctions). 
???
 For the Korean government's pro-active efforts to combat the intellectual property right infringement 
violation, USTR, NTE(Korea), supra note 122, at 300. 
???
 USTR, NTE(Korea), supra note 122, at 299?301. 
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 9?14. 
??? USTR, NTE(Korea), supra note 122, at 301. 
??
the Copyright Act, which is not in compliance with the WIPO Copyright Treaty.??? The provisions on 
online service provider's liability??? are also vague regarding the establishment of liability required to 
clarify the obligations.???
It has been suggested that Korea delete the reciprocity provision relating to data protection??? in 
the Copyright Act, which might serve to discourage the introduction of databases??? by other countries 
without such legislation. Under the TRIPs Agreement, members are required to protect compilations of 
any form of data or other material when the selection or arrangement of their contents constitutes 
intellectual creations.???
Having one of the highest levels of broadband Internet penetration in the world, the Korean 
government is required to effectively respond to the challenges pressed by the changing nature of digital 
piracy by adopting new legal tools and making substantial improvements in enforcement practices. 
Important aspects of Korea's copyright ???  law structure have failed to keep pace with the 
??? Id. at 302. For the issue of service providers' liability under WIPO Copyright Treaty, see World 
Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, chap. 5.226?5.228 
(2d ed. 2004), at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/index.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006).
???
 Computer Program Protection Act, Law No. 6843 (2002) arts. 34.2, 34.3; Copyright Act, Law No. 7233
(2002), arts. 77, 77. 2. 
??? While the TRIPs Agreement overarches requirements that member nations provide basic protection of 
copyrights, patents, and other forms of intellectual property, the agreement prescribed the specific protection for 
computer software. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 10-11, 27(1).
???
 For the general types of legal protection for databases, computer software and programs, information, and 
information technology, see Mangassarian, supra note 68, at 125, 134 (2001). 
???
 Art. 10, ? 2 of the TRIPs Agreement provides that databases are a separated subject of the protection of 
databases: The protection, not extending to the data or material itself, shall not be in contradiction with any copyright 
subsisting in the data or material itself. Thus, this Article may well do no more than codify the existing position under 
copyright law. Michael Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Concise Guide to the
TRIPs Agreement 50 (Sweet & Maxwell 1996), cited by Mangassarian, id. at 131. 
???
 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(1) (protecting computer programs as literary works). TRIPs 
Agreement also states that member nations "shall provide authors and their successors on title the right to authorize or 
to prohibit the commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of their copyright works." TRIPs Agreement 
supra note 1, art. 11, cited by Anawalt, supra note 57, at 388.
??? For papers on the copyright, see Manesh Jiten Shah, Problems With Sharing The Pirates' Booty: An 
Analysis Of Trips, The Copyright Divide Between The United States And China & Two Potential Solutions, 5 Rich. J. 
Global L. & Bus. 69, 69 (illuminating the effect of software piracy on the United States economy by analyzing the 
current system of preventing, punishing and recovering from such activities); Elaine B. Gin, International Copyright 
Law: Beyond The WIPO &TRIPs Debate, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 763, 763- 91 (2004) (focusing on
international copyright law and the organizations that deals with such rights); Graeme B Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, TRIPs And The Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 95, 95-122 
(2004) (examining approaches to TRIPS dispute resolution that could cabin the choices of legislation available to 
deal with emergent substantive problems); Ruth Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement And The Source of (International) 
Copyright Law, 49 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 585, 585-635 (2001) (discussing the various strategies for dispute 
settlement and the resulting implications for the future of copyright law and policy); Laurence R. Helfer, A European 
Human Rights Analogy For Adjudicating Copyright Claim Under TRIPs, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 8, 8-16 (1999) 
(arguing that TRIPs jurists will benefit significantly from employing a "European human rights analogy" when 
adjudicating IPR disputes); J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around The Trips Agreement: The Case For 
??
transformation of the market resulting from digitalization and high-speed access to the Internet: Korea 
should, for example, introduce legislation that provides a full set of exclusive rights for sound recording 
producers.???
Relating to technical protection measures(TPMs), although the Korean government improved the 
Copyright Act,??? the Act does not clearly protect technologies that manage accession privileges, nor 
does it prohibit the act of circumvention itself, only the creation or distribution of circumvention tools, 
which does not comply with the global minimum standards embodied in the WIPO Copyright Treaty???
and TRIPs Agreement.??? Korea has been requested to establish the sufficient copyright protection 
system as required under the TRIPs Agreement,??? and also to clarify the availability of injunctive and 
ex parte relief in civil enforcement actions as is required by the TRIPs Agreement.???
Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives To Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions , 9 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int'l L. 11, 11-68 (1998) (explaining the need for a cooperative approach, and a means of implementing for the 
international intellectual property); Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork To Networks: Strategies For International 
Intellectual Property In Flux, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 69, 69-90 (1998) (analyzing the shifting process in 
intellectual property from patchwork to network in relation with laws in conflicts and strategies available during such 
shift); Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under The TRIPs Agreement: The Case For A European 
Human Rights Analogy, 39 Harv. Int'l L. J. 357, 357-439 (1998) (arguing that TRIPs jurists can effectively address 
core methodological questions by reaching beyond the confines of the WTO system to learn from and build upon the 
accumulated wisdom generated by a supranational tribunal that has already addressed similar concerns); Shira 
Perlmutter, Jerome H. Reichman & Whitmore Gray, Copyright And International TRIPs Compliance, 8 Fordham 
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 83, 83-97 (1997) (focusing on the current efforts toward implementing the TRIPs 
Agreement); Frank Wooldridge, The Interpretation And Application Of Articles 45 And 61 Of The TRIPs Agreement, 
1997. Intell. Prop. Q. 514, 514-20 (regarding for infringement of intellectual property rights); Eric H. Smith, 
Worldwide Copyright Protection Under The TRIPs Agreement, 29 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 559, 559-78 (1996) 
(discussing piracy losses on a regional and global basis, emphasizing industry-based variations and the economic 
impact of these losses).
??? See John J. P. Howley & Antonino B. Roman, Assessing Enforcement Status of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Asia, 1999 N.Y.L.J. S2, S2, cited by Su, supra note 51, at 193 n.133; USTR, NTE(Korea), supra note 122, 
at 301. 
???
 For the important steps taken to strengthen the Copyright Act in 2003, see USTR, NTE (Korea), supra
note 12, at 301. 
??? See World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and 
Use, 5. 562 (2004).
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 44-46.
??? Id. arts. 9?14. 
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 44, 50. Enforcement procedures, besides the permission of 
effective action against infringements, must include expeditious remedies and Member?s judicial authorities are 
required to have authority to order prompt and effective provisional measures, for the two situations, that is, to 
prevent infringement from occurring by preventing the distribution for sale or importation of infringing goods and to 
preserve evidence. [TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 50(1).] The provisional measures, herewith, is quite similar 
to a preliminary injunction. [Silvia Fabina Faerman, The New Patent Law and the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 8 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 157, 160 (2001/2002)]. Above provision obliges to 
allow local judiciaries to order "provisional measures" even without a prior hearing of the alleged infringers, but there 
is no firm obligation to exercise this power in practice. See TRIPs Agreement, id. art. 50(2). For the more details 
about preliminary injunction, see Thomas Dreier, TRIPs and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in 18 
IIC Studies: Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law: From GATT to TRIPs - The Trade-Related Aspects of 
??
While the amendments to the patent, trademark, utility model and industrial designs??? laws were 
made in 2001 to strengthen the penalties for infringement cases,??? they are required to be strengthened 
further for IPR violations to serve as a more effective deterrent to piracy as required by the TRIPs 
Agreement.??? Under the TRIPs Agreement, member states are required to maintain enforcement 
procedures available under the law to effectively block any act of infringement of intellectual property 
rights as specified in the TRIPs Agreement.???
The Korean government has taken steps over the years to strengthen the protection of data or patent, 
but problems remain, including the lack of coordination among the government agencies concerned 
Intellectual Property Rights 248, 263?64, 272?73 (Friedrich -Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker eds. 1996) (noting 
reluctance of French courts to issue preliminary injunctions); see also Jay Dratler, Jr., Intellectual Property Law : 
Commercial Creative and Industrial Property ? 13.01[1] (1996). 
??? For papers on industrial design, see Ziad J. Katul, The Anatomy of an Eye of the Court: The Test for 
Infringement of an Industrial Design, 18 Intell. Prop. J. 327, 327-54 (2005) (reviewing the case law setting out two 
tests for the infringement of an industrial design and articulating what the test should be, and why); G. Scanlan & 
Sarah Gale, Industrial Design and the Design Directive: Continuing and Future Problems in Design rights, 2005 J. 
Bus. L. 91, 91-112 (examining how the EC reforms will affect English intellectual property law and considering 
some of difficulties that existed and to what degree these difficulties have been resolved by the implementation of the 
Design Directive); Jonathan Hudis & Philippe Signore, Protection of Industrial Designs in the United States, 27 Eur. 
Intell. Prop. Rev. 256, 256-64 (2005) (discussing the protection of industrial designs in the US through the use of 
design patents, trade dress and copyright); Susanna H.S. Leong, Protection of Industrial Designs as Intellectual 
Property Rights: New Laws in Singapore, May. 2003 J. Bus. L. 239, 239-51 (discussi ng the law pertaining to the 
protection of designs of industrial products in Singapore which was based on UK law); William T. Fryer III, 
European Union (EU) Revolutionizes General Industrial Design Protection, 84 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 899, 
899-904 (2002) (emphasizing some of the features of the new EU Community Design Regulation, its history and 
importance to future development of global design protection); William T. Fryer, III, An Overview of Industrial 
Design Law Global Development, 10 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L. J. 63, 63-67 (2002) (overviewing international industrial 
design law, including a history, current events, and the vision for the future); Amy Muhlstein, Margaret Ann 
Wilkinson, Whither Industrial Design, 14 Intell. Prop. J. 1, 1-57 (1999-2000) (reviewing the development of the 
protection of industrial designs, the extent of international co-operation, and the protection of industrial design in 
advanced countries, and leading suggestions for Canada's design laws and treatment); Teruo Doi, Japan: Industrial 
Designs-Priority Dates for Conversation for Utility Models, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. N45, N45 (1999) (analyzing
the case on whether design was unregistrable on basis that original application for utility model had been converted 
into one for design registration); Jason G. Ellis, Industrial Design Protection After Phillips Electronics NV v. 
Remington Consumer Products – The Shape of Things to Come, Mar. 1999 J. Bus. L. 167, 167-80 (providing a 
perspective on the development of industrial design law in the United Kingdom and examining the potential impact 
on this area that possible trade mark registration will have in light of the Philips decision); William T. Fryer, The 
Evolution of Market Entry Industrial Design Protection: An International Comparative Analysis, 21 Eur. Intell. Prop. 
Rev. 618, 618-23 (Dec. 1999) ( analyzing two steps in the direction of improved market entry protection of product 
appearance and discussing their practical implications); K.H. Pun, China's Protection of Industrial Designs: Is it Well 
Designed, Intell. 1998 Prop. Q, 56, 56-65 (reviewing China's protection of industrial designs offered by patents, 
copyright, and unfair competition law); David Goldenberg, The Long And Winding Road, A History of The Fight 
Over Industrial Design Protection in The United States, 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 21, 21-62 (1997) (showing the 
breadth of impact the lack of effective design protection has had on American industry); Francois Curchod, The 
Revision of the Hague Agreement concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 599, 
599-610 (1996).
???
 USTR, NTE(Korea), supra note 122, at 300?01. 
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 41(1). 
??? See id. arts. 44?46. 
??
resulting in the approval of marketing for products that may infringe on existing patents.??? Korean 
government is required to provide full protection against unfair??? commercial use??? of test data 
submitted for marketing approval,??? as outlined in the TRIPs Agreement.???
Many of the above indicated anti-competitive practices would not be in compliance with the 
concerned provisions of the TRIPs. In some areas, particularly in the Internet-related industries, speedy 
innovation and penetration in Korean society could not be handled through the proper enacted or 
improved provisions concerned. Out of such practices not in compliance with the international regulation, 
many parts are not directly related to substantial parts of the legal protection systems but the enforcement 
procedures ensured by the WTO member countries' governments as required under the TRIPs 
Agreement.??? Korea's general IPR enforcement is required to be more non-discriminatory,???
transparent,??? and sustained,??? as required by the TRIPs Agreement.???
Out of anti-competitive or unfair trade practices discussed so far, some parts, however, are affected 
by the social or cultural circumstances specific to Korea including the deeply accepted social idea that the 
intellectual property rights are part of human heritage and also social stability is more important than the 
social productivity or efficiency, as well as by the over-all low level of social and economic development. 
Under the current WTO provisions, these controversial social and cultural aspects are very complicated 
and difficult to justify. It may take a substantial amount of time to clarify and to find acceptance from 
developed western countries and WTO standards partly because of the cultural characteristics of Korean 
society.
???
 USTR, NTE(Korea), supra note 122, at 303. 
???
 Regarding the difficulty to define the legal concept of "unfair", see Carolos Maria Correa, Public Health 
and International Laws: Unfair Competition under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted for the 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 Chi. J. Int'l L.69, 72?73 (2002) . 
???
 For the concept of unfair commercial use in Article 39.3 of TRIPs Agreement, see Correa, id. at 78. 
???
 For the issue of test data protection, particularly, regarding the extent to which a competitive 
model?protection without exclusivity?is compatible with the minimum standards set forth by Article 39.3. See id. 
at 70?73. 
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.3. 
??? Id. art. 41. 
??? See id. arts. 3?4, 41(2). 
??? See id. art. 63. 
??? See USTR, NTE(Korea), supra note 12, at 299 ?301. 
??? See also GATT 1994, supra note 2, arts. I, X.
??
?. Japanese Markets
Transparency issues as trade barriers in Japanese intellectual property markets as well as in 
commodity and service markets have traditionally been the core subjects of trade disputes with other 
trading partner countries:???  At stage of rule making process, even though public policy and 
regulations are made by and instituted through constant interaction with the private sector,??? few 
opportunities exist for interested parties without special access to the authorities or related councils to 
have input into the legislative process.??? To solve this problem, Japan adopted its first government-
wide Public Comment Procedures in 1999, nevertheless, it has been evaluated to have only had a 
marginal impact on the substance of new regulations.???
Administrative guidance in Japan has been utilized as a traditional tool of Japanese government 
policy and is the key to the lack of transparency.??? In Japan, the vaguely worded statues allow courts 
to grant ministries' broad discretion in their regulatory methods. Combined with low levels of judicial 
review, this broad discretionary authority insulates much of Japan's industrial policy from challenge.???
The opaqueness inherent in this excessive or extensive use of informal directives or administrative 
guidance??? has traditionally been evaluated as an impediment to Japanese markets.???
The increasing use of the Internet and explosive growth of high-speed access in Japan has presented 
new challenges for protecting intellectual property rights, in particular, copyrighted materials. The 
protection of this material is critical for electronic commerce to flourish and for content-related industries, 
??? See James D. Southwick, Operation of The WTO Agreements in The Context Of Global Commerce And 
Competition, Investment and Labor Markets, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 923, 925 (2000) (stating that transparency 
issues in Japan would be difficult to solve through WTO procedures). 
??? See Ken Duck, Now that the Regulation Has Lifted: The Impact of Japan's Administrative Procedures 
Law on the Regulation of Industry and Governance, 19 Fordham Int'l L. J. 1686, 1669-70 (1996) (criticizing the 
Japanese Shingikai system that even though the system's purpose is to gather expert opinion and provide an open 
forum in legislation, and etc., bureaucrats frequently use this system to diminish opportunities for open conflict in 
policy adjustments). 
??? See Higuchi Norio, Lecture on Japanese Information Disclosure (Mar. 1992), cited by David Bolong, 
Access to Government?Held Information in Japan: Citizens' "Right to Know" Bows to the Bureaucracy, 34 Stan. J. 
Int'l L. 1, 4 (1998). 
??? See Lee, supra note 16, at 190?91. 
??? See Duck, supra note 162, at 1709 ?11. 
??? See Frank K. Upham, Law and Social Change in Post War Japan, 169 (1987), cited by Duck, id. at 1703. 
???
 For the chronic feature of administrative guidance in Japan, see Hiroko Yamane, Deregulation and 
Competition Law Enforcement it Japan: Administratively Guided Competition?, 23 W. Comp. 141, 155 (2000). 
???
 Duck, supra note 162, at 1687. 
??
such as programs,??? games, music, film and software??? to develop. 
Despite an improvement of Japan's legal and administrative intellectual property framework, several 
key issues, including the improvement of the protection framework for the digital copyrights remain.???
As a result, Japan has been a main target of the United States' unilateral acts??? under the Special 301 
with regard to the improper protection of the foreigners' intellectual property rights.??? Japan is 
required to ensure clear-cut and balanced ISP liability rules through the proper implementation process 
for this new law.???
Even though the Japanese government took a significant step forward in protecting temporary copies 
by recognizing that temporary storage implicates the reproduction right,??? the scope of protection for 
temporary copies remains vague,??? which could erode the protection of copyrighted materials in Japan. 
The Berne Convention incorporated into the TRIPs Agreement provides that authors must have the right 
of authorizing the reproduction of their works in any manner or form,??? and the WIPO Copyright 
???
 Computer programs, whether in source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the Berne 
Convention (1971). TRIPs Ageement, surpa note 1, art. 10.1.
???
 For the definition of software, see United States Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Compendium of 
Copyright Office Practices, 1984, para. 32, cited by Mangassarian, supra note 68, at 137; Chris Reed, Computer Law,
19 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 626, 626-27 ( Sweet & Maxwell Limited and Contributors 1996), cited by Mangassarian, id. 
at 136. For the software as a deeply controversial subject matter in the intellectual property regime, see Anawalt, 
supra note 57, at 388?89.
???
 For the areas needed to be improved in Japan, which have been identified by the United States, see U.S. 
Trade Representative, 2004 National Trde Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (Japan) (hereinafter, USTR, 
NTE(Japan)) 266,        at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/2004_National_Trade_Estimate/2004_NT
E_Report/asset_upload_file860_4776.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
???
 For the criticism against unilateral trade acts of the United States under the WTO regime, see Abbott, 
supra note 86, at 389 n.15. 
???
 Japan was removed from the Special 301 Watch List on May 1, 2000. However, the United States has 
since expressed concern about some aspects of intellectual property rights protection in Japan. See USTR, 
NTE(Japan) supra note 171, at 266?68. 
???
 For review of the key differences between the Japanese and American approaches to copyright protection 
for computer programs and databases, see Dennis Karjala & Keiji Sugiyama, Fundamental Concept of Japanese and 
American Copyright Law, 36 Am. J. Comp. L 613, 613 (1988), cited by Frank X. Curci, Protecting Your Intellectual 
Property Rights Overseas, 15 Transnat?l L. 15, 22 n.33 (2002). 
???
 For the treatment of temporary copies in Japan which has been exacerbated by a Japanese court decision 
in 2000, see U.S. Trade Representative, 2003 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (Japan) 
(hereinafter, USTR, NTE(Japan)) 217, at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2003/2003_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file214_
6206.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2006). 
???
 For the rights of reproduction in a digital environment where a reproduction is of a temporary nature, see
World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 134, ch. 5.220, 5.563  (2004). 
???
 Berne Convention, supra note 91, art. 9. 
??
Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, to which Japan is a party, contain an agreed 
statement affirming that the reproduction right fully applies to works in digital form.???
The sound recordings dispute of 1996-97, the first intellectual property dispute settlement case at the 
WTO,??? was resolved with a Japanese amendment of its law to satisfy its WTO obligations, which has 
been evaluated to increase the level of protection afforded to foreign countries' intellectual property rights 
in Japan.??? Despite the Japanese government's progress to prohibit copyright infringement,??? and 
to combat software piracy,??? the Japanese government should take steps to reduce the software 
piracy.??? To create an effective deterrent against piracy, Japan's Civil Procedures Act needs to be 
modified to award statutory damages rather than actual damages,??? and to provide for more effective 
procedures for evidence.???
For Japan's accession to the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the Copyright Law was revised to implement 
criminal penalties for producing and distributing devices designed to circumvent copyrights and for 
illegally revising copyright management information to make a profit. The provisions on anti-
circumvention devices to be applied only to devices whose "principal function" is circumvention are 
allegedly inefficient for anti-circumvention.??? The law also expands the coverage of screening rights 
from motion pictures to still pictures and sets transfer rights so that the first-sale doctrine covers film, 
books, and CDs and is essentially in compliance with the TRIPs Agreement.???
???
 World Intellectual Property Organization, supra note 134, ch. 5.562 (2004). 
???
 For the WTO as a place to resolve dispute concerning intellectual property right, see Dreyfuss &
Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 275. 
???
 USTR, NTE(Japan), supra note 175, at 215?16. 
??? See id. at 216?17. 
???
 For the definition of piracy for the purpose of the TRIPs Agreement, see TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, 
art. 51. 
???
 For example, Japan's Civil Procedures Act is required to award statutory damages than actual damages 
and to provide for more effective procedures for collecting evidence. USTR, NTE (Japan), supra note 171, at 267. 
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1 art. 44. Regarding remedies in general, the TRIPs provisions require 
that states empower local judicial authorities to order compensatory damages, expenses. Id. art. 45. Courts must 
likewise have authority to impound or destroy infringing goods, and they must not normally release counterfeit 
trademarked goods into the stream of commerce in any case. See id. art. 46.
??? USTR, NTE(Japan), supra note 171, at 267. 
??? Id. 
???
 Member countries are required to provide authors and their successors in title the right to authorize or to 
prohibit the commercial rental to the public of original or copies of their copyright works, in respect of at least 
computer programs and cenematographic works. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 11. 
??
Regarding industrial property rights, the trading partner countries have been concerned with several 
aspects of Japan's patent administration,??? including the narrow patent claim interpretation,??? the 
relatively slow process of patent litigation in Japanese courts and the lack of an effective means to compel
compliance with discovery protection for confidential information produced relative to discovery.???
Those concerns are related to the purpose and principles of the TRIPs to reduce distortions and 
impediments to international trade, and promote effective protection of intellectual property rights.???
The trading partner countries are also concerned about the lack of patent protection for business methods 
in Japan, particularly those related to the Internet, which contradict the provisions of the TRIPs requiring 
member countries to provide patents for inventions in all fields of technology, including business 
methods.???
Addressing these issues, Japan revised patent law in 2000 to provide more sufficient patent 
protection: Key provisions included increasing requirements on alleged violators to justify their actions, 
obligating alleged violators to cooperate with calculation experts, giving judges discretion over the 
penalty for damages, increasing the penalty in fraudulent patent case, and allowing courts to seek
technical advice from the Japan Patent Office(JPO).??? This improvement is expected to improve the 
level of patent protection as well as the burden of proof required by Japanese courts??? and also the 
???
 For the different administration of the patents among the countries, see D.Somoya, Obtaining and 
Protecting Patents in the United States, Europe and Japan, in Regulatory Encounters: Multilateral Corporations and 
American Adversarial Legalism 279?309 (R.A.Kargan & L. Axelrad eds. 2000), cited by Drahos & Braithwaite, 
supra note 78, at 476 (analyzing comparatively the Japanese, the United States, the European, the German/Japanese, 
and the Anglo?Saxon models). 
???
 For example, under Japan's Patent Law (Law No.121 of 1959, art. 36), if prior to filing a patent 
application, the invention is publicly known or used in Japan or abroad, if it is described in a printed publication and 
distributed, or if it became publicly available through electric telecommunications in Japan or abroad, the Japanese 
Patent Office will deny registration of the patent because the invention is no longer "absolutely novel". (See Japan's
Patent Law, id. art. 29, cited by Curci, supra note 174, at 25). However, Japan?s "first?to?file" registration system 
in patent application is indicated to foster patent flooding in Japan, along with other Japanese patent practices. Under 
the ?first?to?file? registration system, patent rights are granted to the first person who files a patent application 
for a particular invention, even if the applicant was not the first person to conceive the idea for that invention. See
Jennifer Chung, Does Simultaneous Research Make an Invention Obvious? The 35 U.S.C. 103 Nonobvious 
Requirement for Patents as Applied to the Simultaneous Research Problem, 11 Alb. L.J. Sci & Tech. 337, 342 (2001), 
cited by Curci, id. 
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 34.3 ("... the legitimate interests of defendants in protecting their 
manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account"); USTR, NTE(Japan), supra note 171, at 266. 
???
 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble. 
???
 For the rather earlier comment on the patent system as a fundamental tool of business, see Edwin Prindle, 
quoted in David F. Noble, America by Design 8 (Alfred A. Knopf ed. 1979), cited by Drahos & Braithwaite, supra
note 78, at 457.
???
 USTR, NTE(Japan), supra note 171, at 266.
???
 The burden of proof has been particularly enormous to foreign patent owners in the past. USTR, 
NTE(Japan), supra note 175, at 216. 
??
business circumstances in Japan.??? This, in turn, would lower the cost of access to Japanese courts that 
has particularly been onerous to foreign patent owners in the past.???
Regarding trade secrets, Japan amended its Unfair Competition Prevention Law to impose criminal 
sanctions against the disclosure of corporate secrets, and Civil Procedures Act to improve the protection 
of trade secrets??? in Japanese courts by excluding court records containing trade secrets from public 
access, which, however, are assessed to be inadequate: Under the Unfair Competition Prevention Law, 
the scope of the amendment is limited, and in case of the Civil Procedures Act, since Japan's Constitution 
prohibits closed trials, the owner of a trade secret seeking redress for its misappropriation in a Japanese 
court is forced to disclose elements of the trade secrets while seeking protection.???
Because of this fact, as well as the problem that court discussions of trade secrets remain open to the 
public with no attendant confidentiality obligation on either the parties or their attorneys,??? protection 
of trade secrets in Japan's court are considerably weaker than in the courts of other developed 
countries.??? This constitutional interpretation in Japanese court in relation with trade secret protection 
will not be in compliance with the TRIPs Agreement,??? which should be observed by the member 
countries even though its observance is against constitutionary interpretations under the strict WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism.???
With relation to border enforcement, trade partner countries remain concerned about the 1997 Japan 
Supreme Court decision to allow parallel imports??? of patented products. Furthermore, insofar as 
???
 This improvement would be very important to the, so called, "knowledge creating company". For the 
importance of the patent system to the global knowledge firms, see Drahos & Braithwaite, supra note 78, at 452?55. 
???
 USTR, NTE(Japan), supra note 171, at 266. 
???
 Trade secrets are defined as confidential and proprietary information of an owner which is used in the 
owner?s business to provide an economic value or advantage to that owner because the information is not generally 
known to the public and under circumstances where the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep the information 
secret. See e.g. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office website, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/main/glossary/index.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2006 ), cited by Curci, supra note 174, at 27. 
???
 USTR, NTE(Japan), supra note 171, at 268.
??? Id.
??? For the controversial aspects of protection of undisclosed information, see Anawalt, supra note 57, at 389. 
??? See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39. 
??? The provisions of the GATT 1947 that Part? (mostly on non?tariff barriers) would apply only to the 
fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation were deleted from the GATT 1994 provisions. 
??? For the parallel imports under the TRIPs Agreement, see Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 280 
n.12; Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the International Trade Law Committee of the International Law 
Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation (June 1997), 1 J. Int'l Econ. L. 607, 607 (1998). For the United 
States' softening of its stand against parallel trade in patent pharmaceuticals, particularly, after the Seattle Ministerial 
Conference, see Abbott, supra note 75, at 171.
??
Japan provides ex officio border enforcement of trademarks and copyrights through the Japan Customs 
and Tariff Bureau, efforts should be made to enhance such enforcement through aggressive interdiction of 
infringing articles. 
Japan has been required to improve its application, inspection and detention procedures to make it 
easier for foreign right holders to obtain effective protection against infringed intellectual property rights 
at the border, as required by the TRIPs Agreement.??? According to TRIPs Agreement, border 
measures should be applied to, at least, counterfeiting and piracy cases, leaving flexibility to member 
governments determining to include other infringements of intellectual property rights.???
Japan has faced demands that its intellectual property-related policy, law and enforcement should be 
operated in a more clear-cut or balance-based direction notwithstanding its government's sustained efforts 
to enhance its level of enforcement of intellectual property-related policy and regulations. Substantial 
parts of the anti-competitive practices indicated above would be incompatible with the level of Japanese 
economic development. It would, however, need more serious consideration to evaluate them just in 
accordance with the concerned provisions of the TRIPs Agreement which provides relatively high levels 
of minimum standards without cultural/social considerations in protecting intellectual property rights: 
because the reasons for such criticism and demands may more or less be related to the cultural 
characteristics of Japanese society, which is similar to those of Korea. 
For example, Japanese constitutional interpretations prohibiting closed trials even in the case of trade 
secret-related trials may reflect the government's policy objectives to emphasize social stability and the 
protection of people before the courts secured by the strict enforcement of the principles regarding 
judicial procedures. These policy objectives might be somewhat different from those of developed 
western countries that put more emphasis on efficiency or productivity of the societies' competitiveness or 
operative efficiency compared to the stability or protection.
???
 Members are required to adopt administrative or judicial procedures which afford right?holders the 
opportunity to stop the importation of infringing goods at the border through customs action. (TRIPs Agreement, 
supra note 1, art. 51). Each member is also obligated to designate an administrative competent authority to treat with 
the right?holders ' application for customs action. (TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 51). Competent national 
authorities may also act ex officio to suspend the release of goods for which prima facie evidence of infringement is 
available, although the TRIPs Agreement does not require WTO member states to authorize this option. (See TRIPs 
Agreement supra note 1, art. 58). A wrongful detention of goods requires compensation. See TRIPs Agreement supra
note 1, arts. 55-56 (regarding deadlines for provisional relief). 
??? TRIPs Agreement, supra note 1, art. 51. This provision is one example of international minimum 
standards of protection to be provided in TRIPs Agreement. 
??
?. Review
The anti-competitive practices in intellectual property markets of the two countries outlined above 
as trade barriers could be grouped into two categories if they are analyzed from the policy-motivational 
backgrounds of such practices: anti-competitive practices resulting from the overall underdevelopment of 
their legal and regulatory systems including negative policy objectives to disregard the real value of the 
intellectual property protection; anti-competitive practices originating from and reflecting the cultural-
social factors??? unique to the two countries. 
The two countries' governments should try to positively and strictly implement competition policies 
and regulations to eliminate or avoid the anti-competitive practices originating from the 
underdevelopment of regulatory systems and the negative policies. 
In the second category, those anti-competitive practices could not easily be eliminated by their 
government's short-term policy or regulation, but could be improved gradually through the social 
awareness to a new significance of the intellectual property rights which should be supported by the long-
term policy consideration. In the debatable aspects of those practices, particularly, in relation with the 
policy objectives affected from the cultural and social environments??? of the two countries, it will take 
substantial time to get them in line with the global standards required by the TRIPs or other international 
norms incorporated into the TRIPs.
The above analysis fundamentally shows that the anti-competitive practices as trade barriers in 
intellectual property markets of the two countries have almost identical characteristics, in scope and 
effectiveness, even though there are the differences in the degree of the criticism against those barriers 
from their trading partner countries, which may reflect each market’s economic value to their partner 
countries.???
This result is very similar to the result of the study that the author made about their service 
markets,??? and somewhat different from their commodity markets,??? which revealed that there 
??? For the cultural-social factors as the legitimate concerns or excuses for protectionism, particularly, in 
service sectors, see Orlando Flores, Prospects for Liberalizing the Regulation of Foreign Lawyers Under GATS and 
NAFTA, 5 Minn. J. Global Trade 159, 167 (1994) (stating the cultural concerns prompting, maybe, countries to limit 
foreign lawyers and scope of practice).
??? For the Japan's cultural distinctiveness, in relation with competition policy, see Naohiro Amaya, Harmony 
and the Antimonopoly Law, 3 Japan Echo 85, 91 (1981) cited by Tony A. Freyer, Restrictive Trade Practices and 
Extra Territorial Application of Antitrust Legislation in Japanese-American Trade, 16 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 159, 
168-69 (1999) (stating "... Americans ... argued that the distinctiveness of Japanese society constituted an illiberal, 
illegitimate barrier to their exports. ... the critics maintained that Japan's ideological or cultural distinctiveness 
encouraged collusive and anticompetitive practices ... proponents of such views agreed ... that the Japanese version of 
competition takes the form of solidarity within the company ... and burning enthusiasm for combat in inter-company 
relationships. For the Japanese, it was 'hard to accept' that competition 'produces losers.' ").
??? For the case of the service/investment markets, see Lee, supra note 17, at 160.
??? Id. at 141-64.
??
were substantial differences between the anti-competitive practices of the two countries' markets based on 
their characteristics, scope and effectiveness: that is, some Japanese exclusive business practices in 
commodity and investment markets (more accurately, private markets) were determined to be rooted in 
the intrinsic Japanese social environment which might not be easily controlled by the government policy 
and is different from that of Korea.???
Considering the over-all economic situations of the two countries-including the level of the 
development of the intellectual property, service and commodity markets of the two countries- this result 
implies that regulation on intellectual property markets as well as the service markets??? is deeply 
affected by social or cultural factors as well. As viewed by international standards, the two countries'
cultural backgrounds are almost identical,??? which makes their governments' policy objectives for 
their intellectual property market regulations very similar in their characteristics.???
For example, anti-competitive practices indicated by the Japanese trade partner countries in the
Japanese intellectual property markets including lack of enforcement of the laws to protect the intellectual 
property rights are very similar to those in the Korean markets, which reflect the policy objectives or 
priorities of both countries not to lay stress on intellectual property protection???. The two countries are 
also commonly negative to regulate the temporary copies disregarding the fact that such copies infringe 
on the right holders' reproduction right, which reflects leniency of the policy objectives of both countries 
in regard to the infringements of the other's intellectual property rights. There are many other situations in 
both countries' intellectual property regulations, including constitutional interpretations prohibiting closed 
trials even in the case of trade secret-related trials which is identical to the case of Korea, which mirror
their particular cultural/social circumstances.
Those policy objectives may come from the cultural atmosphere of the two countries to regard 
principally the intellectual property rights as the human beings' common heritage, which has deeply been 
rooted in eastern countries irrespective of their economic or social development levels.??? Such policy 
??? See Lee, supra note 16, at 184-95.
??? See id. at 194-95.
??? See Flores, supra note 206, at 167.
??? See Lee, supra note 17, at 161.
??? See Flores, supra note 206, at 167.
??? The lack of enforcement of the laws to protect the intellectual property rights may seemingly be assessed 
to be resulted from the over-all underdevelopments of the two countries' legal and regulatory systems, however, this 
assessment would not be proper making consideration of the significant difference of the overall development levels 
of both countries' legal and regulatory systems.
??? For the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property, reflecting the atmosphere of intellectual property 
protection as the antitrust regulation in Japan, see Rill & Schechter, supra note 15, at 798 (stating "...countries have 
different substantive standards and different enforcement regimes. ... The Japanese system, like that of several others, 
??
objectives are, seemingly, closely related to the policy objectives of the two countries in regulating 
intellectual property markets to put more emphasis on social stability or consumer protection as compared 
to the social competitiveness or objective efficiency in the developed western countries: Such policy 
objectives reflect the overall social and cultural environment of the two countries which stress stability 
rather than productivity or efficiency of any institute.???
Considering the cultural and social environments of the two countries, their governments are apt to 
be persuaded to respect such environments in enacting and enforcing the related regulations.??? Even 
though the governments of both countries have systematically and legally tried to achieve the minimum 
standards of the TRIPs Agreement in regulating the intellectual property markets, particularly under 
pressure from their trade partner countries as well as the international institutions, it will take substantial 
time to eliminate the real gap between both countries' policy objectives and those required by the TRIPs 
or their trade partners.
Those situations could also partly rationalize the high level minimum standards to regulate the 
intellectual property rights in the TRIPs and also the inducement of the agreement to disagree in certain 
complicated sectors, as well as the compromise between the developed and underdeveloped countries. 
However, the similarity of the anti-competitive practices in intellectual property markets between the two 
countries could not be illustrated as, so called, the south/north issue discussed seriously during the 
negotiations of the TRIPs, considering the significant difference in the level of over-all development 
between the two countries. These analytical results imply that such social/cultural aspects of the 
intellectual property markets should be treated differently from the controversial aspects in the TRIPs 
mechanism??? between the developed and the developing countries.
Regarding international regulations on the cultural aspects of intellectual property markets, no 
cultural exceptions or provisions per se emerge from the text of the TRIPs Agreement as well as in the 
GATS.??? This is in contrast with the case of GATT, where, even though it is far from being sufficient 
to deal with the cultural aspects of trade, there are a few cultural-related provisions.???
does provide low standards because the predominant enforcement tool is through an opaque administrative guidance
process.").
??? See Lee, supra note 17, at 160-61.
??? See Lee, id. at 161.
??? See, for example, Abbott, supra note 71, at 695-96, 718.
??? See supra note 17, at 161.
??? There are cultural exclusions such as Article XX(f) (protection of national treasures of artistic value), 
Article XIX. (emergency action on imports of particular products), and Article IV (special provisions to 
cinematograph films).
??
The current provisions of the TRIPs Agreement have been estimated to be broad and ambiguous 
without considering cultural aspects of intellectual property protection, which allows the interpretation of 
them taking local circumstances and diverse legal philosophies into account. In the WTO world, 
essentially a rule-based society???, the TRIPs disagreement on cultural factors influencing trade-related 
intellectual property rights makes the regulation of them by TRIPs inefficient and controversial among 
the member countries with different cultural and social backgrounds and circumstances. 
Complementary provisions reflecting the cultural differences among the member countries??? are 
expected to be incorporated into the TRIPs in the near future.??? The points bearing in mind when they 
provide for those provisions are that the cultural/social differences among the members or their 
neighboring regions should not be interpreted just with one-sided standards from any grouped members 
and that the provisions should be more detailed and full-fledged than the GATT provisions. 
Until such complementary provisions have been made, the governments of both countries should 
try to establish scientific and concrete evidence to support those practices resulting from the policy 
objectives that reflect their particular cultural-social environments. Such evidence could demonstrate the 
reasonableness and fairness of those factors to international trade, to be necessary to sustain the specific 
public policy objectives, or to be the inevitable reflection of the particular situation intrinsic to their 
countries. 
At the same time, it is advisable to establish the interpretation rules of the WTO Agreement???
that takes into account the cultural and social environments unique to the member countries.??? These 
newly established rules would, to some extent, consider the individual countries' specific situations 
??? For the rule-based global trading system, see generally John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law 
and Policy of International Economic Relations 1-30 (1997).
??? For the cultural-social differences between/among countries including, for example, good faith difference, 
see Abbott, supra note 8, at 186.
??? For the case of GATS Agreement, Lee, supra note 17, at 162.
??? For the definition of the term "interpretation" in comparison with the term "construction", see Joel P. 
Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 Harv. Int’ l L.J. 333, 339 (1999) (stating "In Anglo-American 
parlance, interpretation refers to the determination of the meaning of words contained in a contract, statute or treaty, 
while construction refers to the determination of the intent of the parties in connection with a matter not specifically 
addressed in the text of the document. While the distinction may be a matter of degree, construction raises greater 
questions of legitimacy, of fidelity to the intent of the parties and-in statutory or treaty contents-of democracy."). For 
the adoption of the concept of the interpretation and construction involved by the WTO dispute resolution process, 
see Trachtman, id. at 340 (stating "The WTO dispute resolution process often involves interpretation: ... Some 
dispute resolution proceeding involve construction. ... construction decisions are those involving non-violation 
nullification or impairment. ... recent WTO jurisprudence has seemingly rejected construction. ... However, 
construction occurs where concepts that are intended are implicit in the text though they are not expressly 
articulated. ...").
??? For the case of the GATS Agreement, see Lee, supra note 17, at 162-63.
??
regarding the cultural,??? social, political, or historical backgrounds and environments when they apply 
the WTO rules and regulations to certain countries.??? The establishment of such rules might seem to 
contradict to the recent trends of international trade-related regulations toward hard laws??? as in the 
case of the WTO regime from the GATT.??? However, for the practical and efficient formation of 
international trade and competition regulations, their uniform enforceability should properly be mixed 
with flexibility,??? which should be complemented with the adoption of strict rules of evidence for 
avoiding unnecessary obstacles to trade.???
It could also be indicated that current dispute settlement mechanisms under the TRIPs would not be 
sufficiently capable to meet the controversial disputes in respect with the trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property rights, which were established without sufficient consideration of the cultural/social 
aspects of them. Even though sufficiently evaluating the anti-competitive practices in intellectual property 
market in the terms of cultural and social factors as well as the legal interpretation and applications of the 
concerned WTO provisions might be very difficult and complicated, such an undertaking is 
recommended in order to continue to promote international trade related with intellectual property rights 
without serious cultural/social contradictions among the member countries under the WTO system: such 
cultural/social contradictions among the member countries would function as impediments to the 
??? For the lack of specificity regarding culture and cultural products within WTO, see Karsie A. Kish,
Protectionism to Promote Culture: South Korea and Japan, A Case Study, 22 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 153, 161-62 
(2001) (stating "Its panels have largely to acknowledge that culture may have a dual nature... . The panels have also 
ignored the fact that cultural products may also have a conflicting nature... . This refusal to create specific rules for 
culture and cultural products could reveal the WTO’s reluctance to believe that governments that employ 
protectionist measures are trying to preserve and foster the unique entity of culture ...").
???
 For a general discussion of costs and benefits of these construction rules, see The TRIPs Agreement and 
Developing Countries, UNCTAD, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1996, cited by Drohas & Braithwaite, 
supra note 78, at 451 n.3. This approach, of course, is not contradictory to the strict constructionist interpretation of 
the TRIPs Agreement adopted by the Appellate Body. See Report of the Appellate Body, India-Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R, cited by Reichman, supra note 54, at 446.
??? Hard law refers to a system of norms as to which a relatively high expectation of compliance exists. See
Abbott, supra note 8, at 196.
??? See Abbott, id. at 196 n.44 (stating "The principal evidence of this trend may be found in two areas. The 
first is in the progressive refinement of rules from the general to the specific. The second is in the transition of the 
dispute settlement system from consensus-based to quasi-judicial. ... The phenomenon of rule refinement has been 
underway since the founding of the GATT, ... However, rule refinement does not always result in a significant 
reduction of the level of discretion allowed to national governments, as evidenced to some extent by the SPS 
Agreement.").
??? For example, in the case of the TBT Agreement, taking into account the existence of legitimate 
divergences of geographical and other factors between countries, the Agreement extends to the Members the 
regulatory flexibility to reflect the differences between them. (See TBT Agreement, art. 2.2.) This provision 
extending flexibility to the application of the TBT Agreement could be expanded and applied more generally to the 
construction of the WTO Agreements concerned.
??? In the case of the TBT Agreement, the degree of flexibility shall be limited by the requirement that 
technical regulations "should not become unnecessary obstacles to trade". See TBT Agreement, art. 2.4.
??
continuous development of the WTO regime, which could be adding to the world-wide anti-WTO 
emotion emerging particularly from the non-governmental organizations. 
It is also advisable to improve the current dispute settlement mechanism. One approach to improve 
the current dispute settlement mechanism is to establish the independent TRIPs dispute settlement body 
including a panel and an appellate body.??? The panel and the appellate body would be constituted with 
permanent members with the intellectual property-specified qualifications to deal with the cultural and 
social aspects of the disputes in addition to legal aspects of them and appointed by the WTO through open 
competition procedures. Thus, TRIPs dispute settlement framework would be operated as the well 
established domestic-like international court with a two-tier mechanism with reliable authority, which 
could provide more predictable legal environments in coordinated international intellectual property 
markets.???
?. Concluding Remarks
Many of Japan's and Korea's competition or international trade-related laws, particularly in the 
intellectual property rights, have been enacted and modified passively due to the expressed or implicit
pressure from their trade partner countries and to the requirements of international organizations like the 
WTO and WIPO. Trade pressure on both countries in the intellectual property fields was particularly 
serious from 1980s to 1990s and then after the establishment of WTO system, during which both 
countries took various positive measures to protect the trade-related intellectual property rights. Thus 
such enactments or modifications were relatively not a voluntary response by the governments of both 
countries to internal public and private sector concerns. 
They may have occurred in this manner because of the two countries' rapid economic growth and 
development during the past 40 years were influenced by their governments' strong export-driven policies
without being properly balanced by the corresponding competition regulation and the trade-related 
intellectual property considerations, and their heavy dependence on foreign trade. However, under the 
WTO mechanism, both countries' trade-related competition, intellectual property regulations should be 
??? For the similar suggestion in the case of GATS Agreement, see Lee, supra note 17, at 163-64.
??? For the "soft approach" through the non-binding panel to treat the disputes raised from competition policy, 
under which the parties to the dispute are allowed to select the members of the panel, see Jason E. Kearns, 
International Competition Policy and the GATS: A Proposal to Address Market Access Limitations in the 
Distribution Services Sector, 22 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 285, 313-17 (2001) (stating "First, an ad hoc selection 
mechanism allows the parties to tailor the panel to the specific issue in dispute. ... Second, because the losing party 
participates in the selection of the panel and because the panel will have particular expertise in the precise issue 
before it, panel findings will be more persuasive and legitimate").
??
improved voluntarily and continuously to implement their plans in accordance with the fairly liberalized 
global market systems, under which they could pursue their continuing trade policy objectives. 
Competition policies or anti-competitive practices particularly in the intellectual property markets 
are substantially affected by the historical, political, cultural or social fabrics or environments of the 
individual countries. Thus, it makes it difficult to evaluate those anti-competitive practices in intellectual 
property markets under uniform standards of current TRIPs Agreement as well as to re-establish the 
internationally accepted uniform norms to regulate them. In consideration of this point, this study is 
limited by the fact that the anti-competitive practices of both countries have been comparatively reviewed 
from the viewpoint of international trade norms or competition norms that have only been discussed but 
not yet established, without consideration of other external factors. 
This study is expected to be followed by an interdisciplinary analysis of the anti-competitive 
business practices of the two counties’ intellectual property markets to discover effective and cooperative 
policy directions for treating with those practices. Such an analysis could also suggest a direction towards 
more effective regulation of trade-related aspect of intellectual property rights in these coming WTO 
negotiation rounds. 
